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Introduction 
It has been estimated that only twice in recorded history has the total 
human population in the world actually declined . The second episode 
occurred because of World War II. Fifty-six years after the cessat ion of 
hostilities the passions engendered during the conflict still burn brightly. The 
Enola Gay exhibit at the Smithsonian Museum in Washington , D.C. is one 
example. Several veterans' organizations protested vehemently against wh at 
they perceived as an inaccurate portrayal of Japanese actions during the war. 
Interest in the war years seems to be waxing. Recent movies such as 
"Schindler 's List", "Saving Private Ryan ", and "Pearl Harbor" each deal with 
d ifferent aspects of World War II and all have enjoyed tremendous 
commercial success . The Holocaust Museum has been recently added to t he 
National Mall and plans have finally been approved for a new memorial to 
veterans of the war. 
From an historical perspective, perhaps one of the most heated debates 
t concerns the Allied strategic bombing offensive. From modest beginnings at 
the end of World War I and later during the Sino-Japanese and Spanish Civil 
War, by mid-1945 airpower had blossomed into a deadly real ity. Early 
propon ents of strategic bombing env isioned the abolition of total war . Thei r 
bitter experiences during the Great War forced them to seek some other 
means with whi~h to wage wars . The pointless slaughter of mill ions of men in 
the mud of northern France was to be avoided at all costs. Military planners 
saw in the airplane a new technology that would achieve victory outright or at 
least in a very short time frame by bringing the horrqrs of war directly to the 
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home front. They were convinced that the physical and psychological impact 
of unrestrained bombing on civilians and cities would be so horrible that no 
belligerent would be able or willing to engage in a prolonged war of attrition. 
The German, British, and American bombing campaigns were conducted 
according to theories postulated during the interwar years. 
The results observed during the experiment of strategic bombing have 
been interpreted differently. One position is that the bombing was absolutely 
critical for the successful prosecution of the war. The British and American 
strategic air attacks eroded the Nazis' industrial base, redirected and 
reduced critical resources, and weakened the will to fight among both 
German civilians and military personnel. In opposition is the more recent 
interpretation that strategic bombing not only was a waste of talent and effort 
but was immoral as well. The British and Germans were able to overcome 
the inconvenience of sporadic raids to achieve a huge increase in the 
production of war material . The destruction of precious works of art, 
historically rich cities and towns, and the death of civilians cannot be justified 
according to modern standards of morality. Indicative of this position is 
historian Michael Sherry who characterizes strategic air operations in World 
War Two as, "the sin of atomic bombing, the sin of the whole war's 
bombing." 1 
The intent of this paper is to examine with as little prejudice as possible, 
the evolution of strategic bombing from conception to actualization. The 
reasons why cer.tain decisions were implemented and both the good and bad 
consequences will be examined. As in any human endeavor, both wisdom 
and folly played a substantial role. The scope of actions examined will be 
Michael Sherry. The Rise of American Air Power: The Creation of Armageddon. 
(New Haven , Conn .: Yale University Press, 1987). P. 363 . 
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limited mainly to the European Theater of Operations between the years 1939 
to 1945. A discussion of the theory of strategic bombing however 
necessitates the study of documentation written during the latter stages of 
World War I. Similarly, the observations and study of actual air operations 
will extend to the conclusion of fighting in the Pacific . 
Perhaps one reason strategic bombing generates such conflicting opinions 
is due to the serious and frightening nature of the topic. It is very unsettling 
to live in a world where one's own existence is continually at risk . The basic 
need for security has driven countries into conflict with each other since the 
beginning of civilization. The Strategic Defense Initiative and the proposed 
abrogation of the 1972 Anti·Ballistic Missile Treaty have once again brought 
into focus the question of security from strategic attack. The air offensives of 
World War II were the first large·scale experiments testing the doctrine of 
strategic bombing. It is important to know what happened the last time 
unproven military theory was applied to real world situations. 
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Chapter One 
FORMULATION OF STRATEGY 
Rarely in history has a new theory of warfare been embraced with such 
fervor as that of strategic bombing. Beginning with the Zeppelin raid on 
January 19, 1915, thirty years elapsed before the concept of explosives 
delivered via the atmosphere onto any part of the globe became reality . The 
trials and errors necessary before reaching that point were arduous and 
bloody. The six years of World War II were the cauldron in which theories of 
aerial bombardment were first tested, refined, and then metamorphosed into 
the ultimate weapon, universal fear. The exigencies of armed conflict 
compressed the time necessary to perfect the new techniques and to realize 
their full potential. 
"- It has been claimed that terror bombing is simply the continuation of a 
long-term trend in attempting to frighten and starve an enemy. Whereas 
earlier warriors fell upon their foes, "with painted bodies and hideous 
screams, poisoning wells and besieging towns, their more sophisticated 
though hardly more civilized successors rain high explosives on factories and 
homes and set fire to whole cities."2 The conventional perspective is that the 
strategic air campaigns of World War II were only a tertiary component of the 
conflict. The purpose of the following is to examine the argument put forward 
by airpower proponents: strategic bombing alone can achieve the de facto 
abolition of total yvar. 
British Field Marshall Jan Smuts wrote about the airplane in August, 
1917 that, "there is absolutely no limit to the scale of its future independent 
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war use. And the day may not be far off when aerial operations with the ir 
devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous 
centers on a vast scale may become the princ ipal operations of wa r, to which 
the older forms of military and naval operations may become seconda ry and 
subordinate. "3 
The best known American advocate of military aviation was General Billy 
Mitchell. As a brash young major in May 1917, his perceptions were 
formulated during reconnaissance missions flown over the mud and squalor 
of the trenches. He noted that, "we could cross the lines in a few minutes in 
our airplane, whereas the armies had been locked in the struggle , immovable, 
powerless to advance, for three years ."4 The plethora of ideas, position 
papers , proposals and recommendations generated by Mitchell were abruptly 
dismissed. Even the sinking by aircraft of the captured battleship Ostfriesland 
and the obsolete Alabama , failed to impress his superiors. Mitchell ' s 
persistence bordered on insubordination and soon came to be perceived as a 
th reat to the chain of command as his arguments became more strident and 
belligerent in tone. He was court · martialed in 1925 and subsequently 
resigned from the Army. To an America recoiling from the horrors of static 
warfare , the notion that , "the entire nation is , or should be, considered a 
combatant force ,"5 was simply too much. 
Although Mitchell's voice had been stilled, his ideas found pockets of 
fertile soil in the intellectually stony ground of post-World War One America . 
2 Peter Ca lvocoress i, Guy Wint, and John Pritchard , Total War: The Causes 
and Cou rses of the Second World War . ( London, England: Penguin Books, 
1989), p. 512 . 
3 David Mac Isaac, Strategic Bombing in World War Two: The Story of the Un ited 
States Strategic Bombing Survey. ( New York: Garland Publishing, 1976), p. 4 . 
4 David . Nevin, Arch itects of Air Power. (Alexandria , Virginia : Time Life Books , 
1977), p.52 . 
5 Ibid ., p. 57 . 
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The United States had been protected from birth by two gigantic moats; the 
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. There was the fear however, that someday an 
enemy could launch a seaborne assault. National defense under such a 
scenario would fall entirely on the shoulders of the navy. The citizenry 
demanded that a hostile fleet be intercepted and destroyed long before 
American soil became a battleground. The army would have no opt ion except 
to wait for an actual landing before being able to contribute to the task of 
defending the homeland . The navy would leap ahead in terms of importance 
and prestige and of course, in funding. To the Army, taking a back seat to 
the navy was clearly unacceptable. It was with intense interest that certain 
members of the Army's leadership observed the results of Mitchell's 
demonstration bombings. 
The opportunity to expand, or at least, to maintain equilibrium with their 
rival service, manifested itself among Army officers in the guise of a bomber. 
The B-17 was designed to carry heavy ordnance on long range missions. Its 
task was to fend off any type of hostile naval expedition while an enemy was 
still far out to sea . Unfortunately for the army, there were no nearby 
countries in the entire Western Hemisphere that presented the necessary 
threat to U.S. interests. In order to justify the development of the B-17, the 
army brass forwarded the argument that the space above the oceans was not 
exclusively the domain of the navy. Planes would be necessary not only for 
aerial observation over land, but for reconnaissance and target acquisition 
and the tracking of hostile ships at sea. Speed and the availability of coast 
based airfields allowed the observation of potential enemy movements far in 
advance of an actual landing. A four-engine bomber was necessary in order 
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to maximize the flight time needed for reconnoitering and to carry heavy 
enough bombs to sink large capital ships. 
It was much easier to persuade the army to adopt the new weapon 
because Mitchell had not focused his cr iticism on his peers but against the 
"hide bound admirals ." Eventually it was the fear that the navy wou ld grow at 
its expense that convinced the generals to experiment with t he idea of a 
heavy bomber force. Air operations were to be strictly under army control 
and accordingly, the enterprise was named the Army Air Corps. Thus, the 
combination of a perceived threat and interservice competition created the 
first component of a nascent strategic air force. Protecting its interests in 
the wake of a new technological development, the army laid the foundation 
for a weapon that would change the world. 
A contemporary of Billy Mitchell was a British General named Hugh 
Trenchard . He shared not only the fiery temperament of Mitchell , but the 
same vision for the use of air power. Trenchard's convictions arose from 
experience gained both before and during the Great War. He was in the first 
class of the Central Flying School in Upavon, England in 1912. In the same 
year, he flew as an observer during maneuvers and recalled , "how vulnerable 
the cavalrymen looked and how far out of place they were. "6 By 1915, he 
began to argue against the forces of conservatism for an expanded ro le for 
aircraft beyond that of artillery spotter. The stalemated trench warfare along 
the Western Front convinced him that, "the airplane was a superb offensive 
weapon. "7 He di(;!grammed the tactics necessary to prevail in plane to plane 
dogfights and also foresaw the opportun ity for aerial bombardment. He 
6 
7 
Ibid ., p. 22. 
Ibid ., p. 26. 
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became convinced that British aircraft , "would need not only machine guns 
but bombs ."8 
Trenchard has rightly been described as the father of the Royal Air 
Force. There is little disagreement that his determination and British bulldog 
tenacity served him well in espousing the creation of a brand new branch of 
the military. The difference between Trenchard and Billy Mitchell is that the 
former gained a powerful ally in the person of Winston Churchill. Both 
Trenchard and Churchill were headstrong and prone to loud arguments and 
debate but the potential of air power and the Zeppelin attacks on London 
during World War I created common ground . 
In 1918, Churchill was able to guide their plan for an R.A.F. through the 
necessary government institutions for approval and funding. First the Prime 
Minister, then the Cabinet, and finally the House of Commons acquiesced in 
the formation of an independent air force that not only would work with the 
Army and Navy, but would, "become more and more the predominating 
factor in all types of warfare."9 Twenty years later, Trenchard and Churchill 's 
foresight saved England from the clutches of Nazi Germany and helped end 
the myth of Hitler's invincibility. 
The Royal Air Force had the advantage of independence from birth and 
did not have to worry to the same degree about antagonizing its older 
siblings . The major military threat to the home island , however, was vastly 
more ominous. Great Britain's moat was only thirty miles wide and several of 
her major populati.on centers and factories were within range of an 
unrepentant and , by the late 1930s, an increasingly bellicose Nazi Germany. 
London is spread out along both sides of the easy to identify Thames River. 
8 
9 
Ibid ., p. 24. 
Ibid ., p. 33. 
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Flying to and bombarding such a target required only minimal navigation 
skills and unsophisticated equipment. British naval bases were more 
dispersed into harder to reach rural areas and were much better defended 
than the cities. Most civilian ports however, were surrounded by their host 
city. Fighters for defense and heavy bomber retaliation became a most 
important military and political issue. Not as wealthy and considerably more 
vulnerable than America, the British committed a far greater proportion of 
defense spending to aircraft development. The consequences of such 
diligence served Britain well in the coming crisis. 
Although the United States and Great Britain would assemble a truly 
strategic bombing force during World War II, it was a little known Italian 
named Giulio Douhet who laid the philosophical foundation for the 
employment of military aviation during the early phases of the Second World 
War. After having seen a grand total of three primitive airplanes, he wrote in 
1910 that, "the sky too is to become another battlefield no less important 
than the battlefields on land and sea. For if there are nations that exist 
untouched by the sea , there are none that exist without the breath of air." 10 
The term airpower was defined as the,''use of space off the surface of the 
earth to decide war on the surface of the Earth." 11 His insistence that the 
Army and Navy recognize the Air Force as a legitimate contender for attention 
and funding resulted eventually in a Billy Mitchell style court-martial. After 
serving time in prison for excessive criticism of inadequacies in the Italian 
armed forces, he fought back with his pen publishing Command of the Air in 
1921. He claimed that he, "did not prophesy then and I do not prophesy 
10 Ibid., p. 18. 
11 Giulio Douhet. The Command of the Air. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Air 
Force History. 1983). Introduction. 
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now. " 12 Rather, it was the exercise of cold logic and mathematical 
calculations that permitted the future of wars to be discerned. In his book, 
he postulated that, "the aeroplane was pre-eminently an offensive weapon 
with no practical way of preventing the enemy from attacking us with his air 
force except to destroy his air power before he has a chance to strike at us. " 13 
, . The first rule was to attack en masse at the very earliest moment; perhaps 
even before a state of war had been formally declared. The bomber force 
must already be constructed and in full operation before hostilities began due 
to the overwhelming advantage accruing to the offense. There would not be 
enough time to mobilize sufficient resources to create an independent air 
force from scratch. Douhet speculated that the battle required to attain 
command of the air would be as short as three days. Defensive measures 
would be superfluous and even harmful. Anti -aircraft guns would have to be 
so concentrated and numerous that no nation could afford to build the 
hundreds of thousands necessary to offer even a modicum of protection. 
Pursuit planes might harass an attacking force but not completely halt the 
onslaught. Friendly fighters would mitigate enemy defensive measures by 
sweeping ahead of the bombers to clear a path. Fighters were to be heavily 
armed with machine guns and fly in close formation to provide fields of 
interlocking fire. Armor plating was to be incorporated to shield fuel tanks 
and crewmen . 
Employing aircraft for any other purpose such as naval reconnaissance or 
to supply troops in. the field was considered wasteful and even defeatist to 
Douhet. He believed that all efforts must be directed to placing as many 
bombers over enemy targets as possible. Patrolling aloft waiting for the 
12 Ibid., p. 26 . 
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enemy to appear was a waste of fuel and gave a crucial advantage to the 
opposition. The only defense was to destroy an opponent's air force at its 
home base and bomb the factories that manufactured their aircraft. 
According to Douhet, after eliminating the threat of counterattack and 
gaining air superiority, the next phase of an air war was to be, "a succession 
of hammer blows, also of great violence, delivered against his cities , with 
objectives his industries, his communications and above all his civilian 
morale." 14 Douhet noted that in World War One, still called the war to end all 
wars during his lifetime, Germany was defeated even though none of the 
ground campaign was conducted on German soil. Germany's cities and 
industrial centers remained unscathed and even her fleet was largely intact. 
Great expense and effort had been directed towards building a force of 
dreadnoughts and heavy cruisers to challenge Great Britain's supremacy at 
sea. Besides the relatively minor and inconclusive Battle of Jutland, the 
surface navy spent the war years bottled up in port. Douhet concluded that if 
the German navy could be forced to surrender after only one skirmish , 
certainly an aerial bombardment of high explosives, incendiaries, and poison 
gas would demoralize the civilian population . The decisive finale would be 
executed by long range heavy bombers "which, by striking massive blows at 
the very heartland of the enemy would rapidly reduce his cities to ruins, his 
people to despair and his government to capitulation. " 15 
Douhet was convinced that the doctrine of strategic bombing would avoid 
the madness of trench warfare that had left such an indelible scar upon the 
psyches of an entire generation of Europeans. He believed the level of 
13 Constantine FitzGibbon, London's Burning. (New York: Ballantine Books, 
1970), p. 11. 
14 Ibid. 
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destruction unleashed from 1914 to 1918 would be easily surpassed and 
occur in a dramatically reduced timeframe during the next war as technology 
improved the effectiveness of both aircraft and armaments. A major reason 
was the expansion and inclusion of the private sector into military 
manufacturing. Private companies benefited from the stability of government 
contracts which allowed the financing necessary to experiment with new 
ideas. 
Douhet also speculated that it would be necessary to create a supreme 
command to coordinate activities among the three branches of the armed 
services . Every aspect of the defensive posture of a country had to be 
considered and intelligently directed . Not only must an independent air arm 
be established, but its mission and operation had to be synchronized with the 
Army and Navy. The older components were still important for protection 
and to secure victory but command of the air became the first, absolute 
priority. No ship or harbor was safe from aerial attack nor were sold iers on 
the battlefield. Resupply, reinforcements and troop movements became 
impossible without air superiority. The new strategy was for ground forces to 
delay and hold the enemy for as long as possible in order to gain the 
advantage in the air. It would be critical to accomplish the task in the 
shortest amount of time possible because once achieved , the belligerent that 
gained command of the air would not lose it. Any attempt to rebuild an 
offensive strike capability would be doomed to failure. Factories and airfields 
would lie defenseless and open to destruction at whatever moment the victor 
deemed opportune. 
Although portraying total war with "no distinction any longer 
15 Noble Frankland , Bomber Offensive: The Devastation of EuroruL (New York: 
Ballantine Books, 1970), p. 12. 
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between solider and civilians, " 16 Douhet believed such future 
conflicts would be more humane because, "they may in the long run 
shed less blood . "17 It was calculated that, "ten planes, each 
carrying two tons of incendiaries, high explosives, and poison gas, 
could destroy everything within a circle of five hundred meters 
diameter. "18 A key assumption was that a bomber or "unit of 
bombardment" as he called it, must be able to eliminate the target 
after only one attack. Using such logic, a force of only three 
hundred and sixty bombers could completely level a city the size of 
London in one massive blow. Douhet did not offer firm estimates 
of the number of potential victims that would be killed by such an 
action versus a protracted war of attrition. After witnessing the 
slaughter of millions of men for the possession of a few miles of 
mud however, he must have assumed that even the destruction of 
London would be less bloody than another episode of trench 
warfare. 
Wars used to be fought in the field between opposing groups of armed 
men. The oceans were also battlegrounds as competing fleets of ever more 
powerful ships endeavored to sink each other, keep open lines of supply and 
communication , and exercise freedom of action. The introduction of aerial 
warfare subordinated the military to an " intermediate means between 
opposed national wills ; and behind them is no longer the vacuum of passivity 
and resignation , but entire populations with all their material and moral 
16 Conrad C. Crane, Bombs. Cities. and Civilians. ( Lawrence, Kansas: University 
Press of Kansas, 1993), p.12 . 
17 Ibid. 
18 Fi tzGibbon. London 's Burning. p. 11 . 
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resources. " 19 Land and naval forces had always acted indirectly against an 
enemy 's national resistance but aircraft overcame the old barriers of 
geography. 
Douhet summarized his theory claiming that, "to bend the enemy's will , 
one must put him in intolerable circumstances ; and the best way to do that is 
to attack directly the defenseless population of his cities and great industrial 
centers.'@ Douhet believed the next great power war would be very intense, 
offensive and short in duration . "Cemeteries would undoubtedly grow larger, 
but not as large as they became before the peace was signed at Versailles ."21 
The acceptance of Douhet's thesis by the British was, to a certain extent, 
pred icated on actual experience. It was a reflection of the consternation 
created by the unrestricted bombing of civilian population centers during the 
Great War . From 1914 to 1918, the British Empire suffered battle deaths of 
908,371 with 2,090,212 wounded. 22 In comparison , 557 civilians were killed 
and 358 injured as a result of German airship raids .23 Despite the huge 
discrepancy, the fear of the unknown , the feeling of helplessness and the loss 
of security convinced public officials to conceive of some form of protection 
against terror bombing. With voters facing the same prospect of death as 
front line combat soldiers, the British government established the R.A.F. in 
April 1918. The purpose was twofold; to protect the civilian population and 
to carry the war to the enemy. Other countries had their indigenous 
advocates of adapting the airplane to useful military applications ; most laying 
claim as the father of their particular air force . But England had first faced 
19 
20 
21 
Douhet. Command of the Air. P. 279. 
Ibid ., p. 282 . 
Ibid . 
22 Encyclopedia Britannica . Macropaedia Volume 29. p. 1008. 
23 Douglas Botting, The Giant Airships. (Alexandria , Virginia : Time Life Books, 
1981), p. 73 . 
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the threat and then the reality of aerial bombardment and thus was the 
leader in incorporating the radical new ideas of the day into posit ive action . 
Clearly, aircraft introduced an entirely different form of warfa re to the 
world . Much more was now at risk for non-belligerents , especially for the 
islanders of Great Britain. The twenty-two mile wide moat protecting them 
since 1066 and the vast navy and army assembled to fight enemies 
'overseas,' suddenly seemed inadequate . In prev ious centuries , a city that 
was susceptible to siege would not only field armed forces to repel invaders, 
but build ramparts and walls for defense. Water, food , weapons , and every 
other resource required to survive was stockpiled as the citizenry hunkered 
down behind their fortifications . The modern , sprawling metropolis had no 
such shield to protect itself from the sword of air attack. To make matters 
worse , high explosives could now be directed against the very infrastructure 
that supported both civilians at home and soldiers in the field. Distance from 
the front became less relevant and every citizen became exposed to death 
and their property to destruction. The term strategic bombing was 
introduced to designate the unprecedented extension of military operations . 
It can be described as, "the massive and systematic bombing of the enemy 's 
war economy and of the enemy population's will to resist." 24 It is by 
definition offensive, "carried on beyond the reach of ground and sea forces 
and without their immediate and direct cooperation and support. "25 
By the m id 1930's, the new theory of airpower had been tested on a 
small scale during the Japanese invasion of China and during the Spanish 
Civil War. The first two trials could be termed tactical operations as opposed 
to strategic bombing although the purpose in both instances was to terrorize 
24 Kent Roberts Greenfield , American Strategy in World War II : A 
Reconsideration. ( Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), p. 88 . 
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the civilian population . The tactical is much more limited in terms of 
duration and target selection. Strategic implies a more systematic approach 
designed not only to immediately assist the advancement of an army in the 
field but to attack the industrial infrastructure supporting military activity . 
Civilian morale was directly assaulted in China and Spain with the underlying 
economic system given little, if any, consideration . True strategic bombing 
can be dated from the beginning of World War II, which now commands our 
attention. 
25 Ibid . 
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Chapter Two 
PRELUDE TO THE FIRST TRIAL 
On September 1, 1939, Adolph Hitler unleashed the Wehrmacht against 
Poland to begin the 'final European civil war. ' German strategy was to 
employ the panzers in a concentrated assault utilizing speed and surprise to 
as great an extent as possible. The intent was to avoid a repetition of the 
static trench quagmire of the last world war and the concomitant pointless 
slaughter of millions of young men. The radically revisionist Nazis were out 
to avenge themselves for the perceived injustices of the Versailles Treaty. 
The objective was to overwhelm opposing forces at the point of attack so as 
to gain as much ground as possible with the fewest causalities. 
In blitzkrieg, the role of the Luftwaffe was to, "first achieve air 
sovereignty over Poland so that German bombers could disrupt the roads and 
railways. Not only that, but the Luftwaffe was also expected to play a leading 
part in the battle itself: bombers and dive-bombers, long range and short 
range fighters, were to harass the ground troops continuously to hammer 
home the idea that capitulation was the only way out."26 A common 
misconception in the West is that the Polish frontier was inundated by 
massive numbers of German bombers that pulverized the entire country. A 
1945 study commissioned by the American military academy at West Point 
surmised that by the summer of 1939, Germany had, "produced a reserve of 
nearly 100,000 pilots" and had at her "disposal an air strength of 7000 first 
line machines."27 British sources, "give the Luftwaffe's strength on 
September 3, 1939 as exactly 4161 first-line aircraft."28 In actuality, "the 
26 Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries. Translated by Frank Ziegler. ( New 
York: Ballantine Books, 1966), p. 7. 
27 Ibid ., p. 8. 
28 Ibid. 
19 
daily strength report of operational qircraft, produced by the Quartermaster-
General for the Commander-in-Chief Luftwaffe, stated they had at their 
disposal not more then 1302 first line aircraft" 29 The reason for the 
discrepancy most likely arose from two sources. The first was the lingering 
effects of propaganda as to the invincibility of the Nazi war machine and the 
inevitability of German victory. The second was the accuracy of air attacks 
especially when executed by Stuka dive-bombers. The uncanny ability to 
consistently place 500 pounds of high explosives directly onto a target was 
certainly more efficient then the general targeting of far less deadly artillery. 
A pilot could visually acquire the objective prior to and during the run and 
immediately know the results of his efforts. Considering the inexperience of 
the defenders in coping with such a shocking tactic, the overestimation of the 
number of aircraft involved is understandable. 
After the thirty day conquest of Poland was concluded, the sitzkrieg, 
"sitting war," in German, "phony war" to the West, settled in. The French 
retired warily behind the security of the Maginot Line and hoped that if an 
attack came, it would expend itself upon their expensive and elaborate fixed 
fortifications. The British also were in denial and wanted to continue believing 
in the appeasement policy of Neville Chamberlain. The airborne and naval 
assault against Norway on April 9, 1940 shattered the illusion of a limited 
conflict and forced France and Great Britain to face the prospect of another 
world war. Even then, it was not until May 10, 1940, that Winston Churchill 
was finally installed as the wartime Prime Minister. That same day also 
signaled the beginning of the German offensive through the Low Countries. 
Again the Luftwaffe led the invasion with fighter sweeps into Belgium and 
Holland. Both the French Army and the British Expeditionary Force took the 
29 Ibid. 
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bait and rushed the bulk of their armies north to face the th reat. Only after 
the Allies committed themselves was the main armored thrust launched from 
the lightly defended Ardennes Forest. The panzers pushed forward quickly 
over the World War I battlefields slashing through the rear areas and cutting 
off the forward troops from supplies and reinforcements . The B. E. F. was 
forced to retreat off the continent via Dunkirk while the French desperately 
sought an escape out of the trap. After a brief pause to rest and refit , the 
panzers turned their attention south and completed the conquest of France 
by late June, 1940. 
During the battle, the Luftwaffe fulfilled its mission admirably . Close 
support for the ground forces was provided to offset the advantage the Allies 
possessed in number of troops as well as in quantity and quality of armor. 
The primary French tank, the Char 8 , was ideally suited for a defensive role , 
being both more heavily protected and employing a larger caliber gun then 
every other German competitor except the Mark IV. 30 Despite such 
disadvantages , the blitzkrieg rolled inexorably towards victory as the Luftwafe 
swept the skies clean of rivals, destroyed opposing defenses and sowed panic 
among the rear echelon soldiers and refugees streaming away from the 
battlefield . 
During the First World War, aer ial combat was considered a sideshow 
involving chivalrous knights dueling aloft in the wild blue yonder while armed 
masses of men struggled to kill each other in the mud. After the passage of 
only twenty·one years , the airplane had evolved to the point of being the first 
consideration in any offensive scheme. Without supremacy in the air, troop 
concentrations were simply killing grounds and large·scale movements of 
30 Robert Wernick, Blitzkrieg. (Alexandria , Virginia : Time Life Books, 1977), 
p. 120. 
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vehicles, target practice. Far from being a subordinate younger sibling to the 
army and navy, the air force attained equal consideration in tactics and 
deployment. 
The Luftwaffe had pioneered the techniques soon copied by every other 
belligerent. However, despite early, overwhelming success, the total war 
unleashed by the Nazis was to bring catastrophe upon themselves. German 
theorists had been instrumental in exploiting the capabilities of the airplane 
but the British had in mind a far greater role for the R.A.F., including heavy 
bombing of economic targets far beyond the immediate field of combat. The 
difference in the application of airpower was soon to be vividly demonstrated. 
r Three 
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FIRST TRIAL: ENGLAND 
In the summer of 1940, it seemed only logical that Great Britain would 
be next in line to experience the brunt of German aggression. A more 
thorough analysis however, concludes that prosecuting the military effort 
against the English should have halted after France capitulated . Mein Kampf, 
Hitler's manifesto, clearly articulates the destiny of Teutonic Germany as 
being the elimination of communism and the subjugation of Russian territory 
for the purpose of providing lebensraum, (living space) for the Aryan race. 
The elimination of French and British opposition was a prerequisite, not a 
substitute for Hitler's eastern ambitions.31 Hitler, being an opportunist, 
wanted to wait for the best possible moment to attack the Soviet Union . 
Gabriel Gorodetsky observed that "Hitler has a tendency sooner or later to 
revert to the tenets enunciated in Mein Kampf."32 The drift of his ideas were 
clear enough: "deal with Poland before turning west; deal with France and 
Britain before turning back to the east. "33 
Great Britain was a small island on the far western periphery of Europe 
and had already been forced into complete retreat from the continent. In the 
aftermath of the defeat of France, Hitler's gaze turned to Russia . There is 
little documentation suggesting that Great Britain was to be invaded and 
occupied. Operation Barbarossa , unlike the events that transpired over 
England , had been carefully planned. Unknown to most, "on 31st July, 
1940, Hitler decided to do that very thing [invade Russia] in the following 
31 Alan Bullock. Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. (london, England: Odhams Press 
Limited. 1952). P. 513. 
32 Gabriel Gorodetsky. Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia . 
(london, England: Yale University Press. 1999). P. 282. 
33 Bullock., p. 17. 
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year."34 The German General Staff, most notably Jodi and Keitel , believed it 
was possible that 80 to 100 divisions could defeat the Russians in four to six 
weeks but that "the operation could not be executed before Spring, 1941. "35 
The campaigning season was already halfway over and the bulk of the Army 
was still in France. The logistics of moving millions of troops , thousands of 
panzers , and the requisite supporting infrastructure across the width of 
Europe were daunting indeed. Even with the efficient German rail and 
highway system, the re·deployment eastward would consume too much time 
and be inadequate within the context of the objectives of Barbarossa. 
Germany was forced to wait. It was the reality of the military situation and 
Goering's boast that he could quickly eliminate the R.A.F. that persuaded 
Hitler to give the Luftwaffe the opportunity to prove itself in the summer of 
1940. 
Churchill and Fighter Command assumed that England was definitely 
the next target and that the Nazis would employ whatever means necessary 
in pursuit of victory. The devastating raid on Rotterdam served to bolster 
their opinion and to justify the pessimistic forecasts that had guided civil 
defense policy during the interwar years. In the course of the First World 
War, three hundred tons of ordnance were dropped on Britain causing almost 
5000 casualties of which one·third were fatal, "giving a figure of sixteen per 
ton of bombs. "36 Two major daylight raids on London resulted in one 
hundred twenty·one casualties per ton while the sixteen night raids yielded 
fifty·two killed and wounded per ton. From such data, the Air Staff in 
34 Kenneth Macksey. Panzer Division: The Mailed Fist. (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 1968), p.63. Parenthesis have been inserted. 
35 Gorodetsky., p. 50. 
36 As the sources consulted are written either in English or translated into English, 
the Anglicized version of Hermann Goering's name will be presented . FitzGibbon. 
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1924reckoned that casualties in a future war would be in the nature of fifty 
per ton of bombs, one-third of which would be fatal. The Committee of 
Imperial Defense estimated in 1938 that 3,500 tons of bombs would be 
dropped on London, "delivered by planes based in Germany, within the first 
twenty four hours of attack, followed by six hundred tons per day."37 The 
civil war in Spain confirmed the earlier fifty casualties per ton figure leading 
the Ministry of Health to project in April 1940 that, "600,000 civilians would 
be killed and 1,200,000 wounded in the first six months." 38 The forecast 
was for between 1,000,000 and 2,800,000 hospital beds for the injured 
depending on the length of stay. Property damage was determined by 
"adapting a material damage multiplier of 35,000 English pounds per bomb. 
They concluded that five percent of all property, valued at 550,000,000 
English pounds would be destroyed in Britain during the first three weeks of 
hostilities."39 The Home Office calculated that, "20,000,000 square feet of 
seasoned timber would be needed each month to provide coffins ."40 It 
would not be possible to move that quantity of lumber into cities since the 
roads no doubt would be blocked by debris and flooded by refugees 
attempting to escape the burning cities. 
The contemplated impact of all the death and destruction would leave 
the survivors emotionally and psychologically debilitated. The Mental Health 
Emergency Committee operated under the assumption that, "three to one 
was the ratio between psychiatric and physical casualties, going as high as 
London's Burning. p. 12. Included in this footnote are raids conducted by both 
airship and Gotha bombers. 
37 Ibid ., p. 13. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Tom Harrisson, Living Through the Blitz. ( New York: Schocken Books, 
1976), p. 24. Actual quotes use the symbol for British pound instead of spelling it 
out. 
40 Ibid. 
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4 ,000,000 mental cases in the first six months of air war."41 The estimates 
assumed a combination of high explosive, incendiary and poison gas 
ordnance. Although there is no evidence that the Germans ever had any 
serious intention of using gas, they were very likely dissuaded from its 
application by the extensive precautions exercised in pre-Blitz London. 
Because Britain was a democracy, Douhet's notion that only offensive 
air operations would be necessary could not be fully accepted. Due to the 
political environment, fighters, barrage balloons, anti-aircraft guns and other 
means were devised to protect the civilian population . Deviating somewhat 
from Douhet, by 1937 the Minister for the Coordination of Defense insisted 
that, "priority be given not to Bomber but to Fighter Command. "42 The 
result was that, "three years later, Britain possessed, the most advanced 
system of air defense in the world."43 
The most important element of the air defense network was the invention 
and implementation of radar. The fundamental philosophy undergirding its 
use was that, "no country could afford to keep 'standing patrols' of fighters in 
the air along its frontiers and coasts . The only hope of defeating bombers by 
fighters lay in identifying the enemy's course and probable objective at a 
considerable distance from his target and then converging the airborne 
defense against the attacking force."44 The element of surprise inherent in 
the attack was thus totally absent. Several other shortcomings in German 
equipment, tactics, and leadership were to be revealed in the coming 
confrontation but it was radar that allowed the R.A.F. to maximize its assets. 
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By anticipating and planning for a worst case scenario , not only was 
London materially prepared to meet the threat but also hardened mentally. 
At first, "the wish was to keep civilians as dispersed as possible," 45 but many 
evacuees moved back into the city after hostilities began but before the Blitz. 
The stories of Stuka dive bombers strafing refugees in Poland and the 
terrorization of undefended Rotterdam had become common knowledge. The 
British had suffered indiscriminate air attack before and were as ready as 
humanly possible to withstand, "the first strategic air operation in history. " 46 
Goering's final directive ordering the destruction of the R.A.F. was officially 
issued on August 2, 1940 although attacks on British shipping had been in 
progress throughout that summer. The precise objective was to, "subdue by 
air power alone a major power with a population resolved to resist. "47 
Much is made of the fact that the Luftwaffe outnumbered Fighter 
Command by two to one and therefore the former should have easily gained 
air supremacy. A closer analysis, however, reveals the flaws in German 
operations. The number of front line Me·109s available to challenge the 
British Hurricanes and Spitfires stood roughly equal at seven hundred 
machines.48 The Stukas and medium Dornier and Heinkel bombers had 
some defensive armament but their guns were too few and of too small 
caliber to threaten the much more heavily armed and agile English fighters. 
The Me·llOs were designed to provide longer·range escort but proved far too 
slow and cumbersome. After the first few encounters, it was realized that the 
twin engine Me·llOs also required an escort. That left the Me·109s as the 
45 Harrisson. p. 35. 
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only credible challenger to Fighter Command in the most important facet of 
the battle. 
A second major shortcoming was the lack of range endemic among 
Luftwaffe aircraft. Only the four engine Condor reconnaissance plane 
displayed an aptitude for long distance flights . German fighter squadrons 
operating from the nearest point to southern Britain , the Pas de Calais and 
the Cotentin Peninsula, required thirty minutes to cross the Channel and gain 
sufficient altitude to effectively shepherd the bombers to their objective. With 
a tactical flying time of eighty minutes, only twenty minutes remained for 
activities over the target area.49 The exigencies of aerial combat quickly 
exhausted any fuel reserves and left pilots with little or no safety margin . As 
much as possible, missions had to executed in a straight line from base to 
target and back so that planes were not forced to ditch in the Channel. The 
defenders knew that assaults would not come from different approaches and 
enemy feints and misdirection were only remotely possible. Anti aircraft 
gunners plotted their firing plans accordingly and aircraft could more easily 
be concentrated. German fighters were forced to attack head on and were 
denied the opportunity to outflank and deceive their opponent. To make 
matters more difficult for the offense, "the actual battle sector over England 
represented not even one-tenth of the total area of the island ."50 The RAF 
abandoned forward air bases except for emergencies and relocated the vast 
majority of their aerodromes outside the range of the German fighters . 
A limited radius of operation violated one of Douhet's most cherished 
tenets: that the air was basically borderless and contained no geographic 
impediments. A bomber could strike at will at any number of targets 
49 
50 
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according to theory. A defender would be too spread out to effectively 
counter every angle of attack. Douhet stated that an enemy airforce must be 
destroyed in the air, at the factory, and at its home base. Fighter Command 
fought the Luftwaffe to a draw in the former and gained the decided 
advantage, by dispersing manufacturing, support and airfields outside the 
combat zone. Able to concentrate their forces and mainta in a short and 
reasonably secure line of communication , the defense was prepared for the 
onslaught. 
The initial targets were the fighter bases , command centers , and 
unusual looking masts that were part of the early warning radar 
system. Although German casualties were high , the Luftwaffe 
was achieving the desired effect of stretching Fighter 
Command to the breaking point. Prime Minister Churchill 
witnessed first hand the seriousness of the situation when 
visiting air operation headquarters on a particularly busy day 
and noting that not a single fighter remained in reserve . 
Churchill's solution was at once brilliant and brutal but had 
the result of saving Fighter Command by inducing Hitler to 
enter an arena of combat he was unprepared for: strategic 
aerial bombardment. 
THE BLITZ 
On the night of August 24, 1940, two German bombers from a force of 
one hundred·seventy became lost in the clouds while on the way to attack oil 
tanks approximately fifteen miles downriver from London. Without adequate 
navigational aids, the two aircraft dumped their payloads and hurried home. 
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As chance would dictate, they were flying directly over the heart of the city. 
The incident was merely a mistake of war with , "little doubt, even at the time, 
that the bombing was unintentional."51 The next night, Bomber Command 
retaliated with a deliberate counterstrike against greater Berlin . The Prime 
Minister himself had "given the instructions that the R.A.F. keep hitting Berlin 
until the Germans reacted."52 The decision to provoke Hitler almost certainly 
must have been the most difficult of Winston Churchill's long and very 
distinguished career. In order to save Fighter Command, and thereby prevent 
the invasion of the British Isles, one of the great cities of the world was 
offered up as a sacrificial lamb. Two thousand years of history and all the 
glory of the empire were at risk of being bombed and burned into rubble. 
In another sense, Churchill was pleased that the long anticipated 
onslaught had finally been unleashed. He wrote that, "I was glad that if any 
of our cities were to be attacked, the brunt should fall on London. London 
was like some huge prehistoric animal capable of enduring terrible injuries, 
mangled and bleeding from many wounds, and yet preserving its life and 
movement. "53 For a man of action, the anticipation is often times the worst 
part. Another source states that Churchill described London as, "the greatest 
target in the world, a kind of tremendous, fat , valuable cow tied up to attract 
the beast of prey. "54 
In Germany, the invasion of Poland and France had been contemplated 
for several years. Blitzkrieg was created for the express purpose of avoiding 
immobile warfare. Every element of the attack, including the weapons 
themselves, had been tested in combat in the Spanish Civil War or in realistic 
51 Leonard Mosley, The Battle of Britain . (Alexandria, Virginia ,: Time Life 
Books, 1977), p. 118. 
52 Ibid ., p. 119. 
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maneuvers. It is surprising, therefore; that, "during the first ten months of 
the war, there was no German plan for the bombing of London."55 
Goering favored mass formations of medium fast bombers aimed 
directly at the center of the capital. He hoped enough explosives could be 
delivered to motivate panicky civilians to clamor for immediate surrender or 
at least some form of accommodation with the Nazis. Staff officers 
responsible for the conduct of the campaign against England, espoused far 
more modest goals. Due to the immensity of the British economy and the 
physical size of London, area bombardment was not considered effective 
particularly when administered by warplanes with limited lifting ability. The 
preferred plan of attack, "was against certain types of vital targets, such as 
the aircraft industry."56 Hitler's rage at the British bomber forays trumped 
military logic and Goering's plan, with its promise of inflicting massive 
numbers of civilian casualties, was implemented. 
On Saturday, September 7, 1940 the Luftwaffe turned its full attention to 
London . The main targets were the docks and warehouses located in the 
East End along the Thames. The ensuing conflagration was the worst in 
London since the Great Fire of 1666. For the next seven days, around the 
clock air strikes were directed towards the same general area. To Goering's 
consternation, the knockout blow planned for September 15 failed and the 
invasion of Britain was postponed. He was elated by the damage reports but 
depressed over the mounting toll of machines and men. German pilots spoke 
of the unmitigated strength of Fighter Command. The number of Hurricanes, 
responsible for "most of the five hundred Luftwaffe bombers lost in combat 
54 Michael Sherry. P. 64. 
55 Constantine FitzGibbon, The Winter of the Bombs: The Story of the Blitz of 
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actions, " and Spitfires, accounting for the vast majority of the "critical Me-
109s lost in combat actions,"57 actually increased during the course of the 
three and one-half month battle. What was even worse for Goering was that 
the component and final assembly factories for the front line British fighters 
were almost all out of range of the Luftwaffe. Even if the targets could be 
located and lie within the normal operational radius of the bombers, a 
tactical air force would have great difficulty in inflicting enough physical 
damage to seriously hamper Fighter Command's supply chain. 
It was anticipated by the German High Command that raids against 
London would draw out every available British fighter. What was more 
difficult to foresee was the reaction of people while living under the bombs. 
Lacking a true precedent, the impact of sustained bombardment on urban 
civilians could not be precisely predicted. Although Chinese and Spanish 
cities as well as Rotterdam had already been attacked by this time, only 
theories had been offered as a guide as to what constituted an effective long 
term campaign. The eventual shortcomings of Luftwaffe doctrine were not 
apparent until well after the Blitz began. Although German strategy was 
executed close to expectations, the response of the intended victims was 
radically different than that foreseen by either side. The observed results 
were so far from earlier predictions, that further analysis is necessary. 
LONDON IN THE FALL OF 1940 
It is not possible to explore in complete detail the full range of emotions 
and factors compelling the actions of some six million human beings, even if 
limited to one place during one hundred days. Some very general 
57 Frank W. Heilenday, The Battle of Britain-Luftwaffe Vs. R.A.F.: Lessons 
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conclusions can be drawn, but there are always exceptions to every 
observation. 
Anticipating the worst in London, " in the first days of September 1939, a 
million and a half persons were evacuated officially."58 Others unofficially left 
their urban homes for the comparative safety of the countryside earning for 
themselves the moniker 'private evacuees.' During the sitzkrieg, of the 
million and a half who had left the city one million , including almost all the 
mothers, had returned by May 1940. 59 The tide reversed itself again after 
the start of the Blitz. Beginning at seven p.m . on September 7, "convoys of 
motor vehicles filled with entire families and piled high with luggage, 
proceeded westwards ."60 The exodus lasted for the next several weeks as 
the attacks continued. Interestingly, there are no official statistics 
documenting the exact numbers of those who stayed, those who moved into 
less threatened parts of London, and citizens who migrated to rural districts. 
The best guess might be that after one year of war, some of these and others 
too went back into the country, fewer than the first time, though perhaps 1.25 
million humans spread over months. 61 
The voluntary natural selection was most helpful in removing those 
residents who might have a more difficult adjustment to the disruptions 
caused by bombs falling all around their hometown . It can not be quantified 
but it seems reasonable to concur with Blitz survivor Tom Harrisson 's 
observation that "those who stayed totally 'put' tended to be of tougher 
calibre ."62 The blue:collar neighborhoods of "the East End , where disaster is 
1995), p. 19 . 
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always just around the corner, seem to take it better than the more 
fashionable districts in the West End" wrote broadcaster Edward R. Murrow.63 
The longshoremen, teamsters, and manual laborers working and living in the 
former endured the heaviest air attacks. As living conditions deteriorated, 
"the intellectual · the man who can write and talk · now counts for even less 
than he did a year ago; the man who can run a lathe, fly a plane, or build a 
ship counts for more."64 Harrisson noted it is helpful in understanding the 
resilience of the civilian population to remember that "most ordinary people 
in those days were used to deprivation and lived every day with anxiety; the 
distress [of the Blitz] was not so much new as additiona1."65 He estimated 
that "over two-thirds of the islanders [British] in the late thirties had next to 
nothing in hand from payday to pay day. The loss of warmth, hot food, even 
furniture, was not a universal novelty." 66 
Great Britain was not a welfare state in 1940. The Great Depression 
was a painful memory just beginning to recede. To the majority, economic 
recovery had not yet alleviated almost ten years of very tight money and 
widespread poverty. For an overwhelming number of people, "family wage· 
earners simply had to earn ."67 The probability of being killed by a random 
bomb during the few hours of an air raid competed with the twenty-four hour 
a day gnaw of a hungry stomach . Only by working could the average 
Londoner provide for himself and his dependents and not be forced to relive 
the privations of the 1930's. If streets of debris had to be traversed and 
some of the basics of .urban life interrupted, it was a small price to pay 
63 Edward R. Murrow, This Is London. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
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considering the unhappy alternative so recently experienced by so many. The 
dread of unemployment and "the need to keep at the job were over-ridingly 
powerful." 68 
The most heavily bombed section of London was called the East End, in 
reference to its geographic location. It contained a preponderance of piers, 
wharves, and warehouses needed to service sea-going merchant ships. The 
greatest number of military targets were located there and it became 
accordingly, the most frequent aiming point for the Luftwaffe. Basil Woon , an 
eyewitness historian who lived in the East End during the Blitz, records that 
blue collar longshoremen and other manual laborers lived near "the dock 
area, in that vast conglomerate warren of slums and humbler homes."69 
Inured to a large degree to pain and danger, they quietly grew more 
determined during the course of the Blitz. For many, the biggest disruption 
was a lack of sleep. Productivity however, was only slightly affected. Even at 
the height of the bombing, Woon calculated that "just as many ships were 
unloading as there were yesterday- which is about twice as many as in peace 
time."70 
The fear of being randomly killed eventually faded and a new emotion 
arose among the survivors. The fact that property was so dear to the working 
poor made ownership extremely important. When Hitler destroyed their 
homes, a groundswell of revenge arose. The war suddenly became quite 
personal. A family with little means witnessing the destruction of not only 
their dwelling but of pictures, mementos, and heirlooms feels stripped of all 
security. Bringing the perpetrators to justice became an overwhelming 
68 Ibid. 
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pass1on. Experiencing the carnage and dealing with the deaths of friends and 
neighbors exacerbated intense emotions. One Londoner wrote, "something 
turns over inside me and for the first time, I began to hate."71 
The West End and the City of London (the financial district adjoining the 
Tower of London) were not as badly damaged physically but the locals 
suffered the same psychological effects. Buckingham Palace and 
Westminster Abbey were hit and both the Queen and King and the Prime 
Minister often toured the battle damaged areas. Though not quite as 
exposed as the East Enders, every other Londoner was nonetheless also at 
risk. 
It is clear from his writings and speeches that Winston Churchill saw 
himself as the guardian of two thousand years of British history and tradition. 
He believed that his tiny island had brought civilization to a large part of the 
world . The industrial revolution began in England first and created wealth to 
such an extent that the middle class was born. The English language was 
exported around the globe and the countries of the United States, India, 
Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and Singapore were all either initially 
colonized or greatly benefited from their relationship with Great Britain. 
Destruction of the physical institutions upon which the English people built 
their empire was as hurtful to Winston Churchill as the loss of one's home 
was to a Cockney. He wanted to harness the instinct to defend and strike 
back at the instigator of such barbaric deeds. Not just self·preservation was 
involved, but the urge to retaliate against the destroyer of everything an 
Englishman identifies with and understands. 
Winston Churchill fervently believed that Germany would attempt to apply 
Douhet's theory and eliminate England as a belligerent by a short but 
7 1 Ibid. , p. 31. 
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massive application of overwhelming airpower.72 Churchill concurred with 
the vision of air supremacy as the first and most important arena of modern 
warfare. Britain could embargo Germany as it had in World War One but any 
effect required a long period of time. The Luftwaffe however, could strike 
quickly before the British Army could be fleshed out to an adequate size, 
trained , outfitted, and transported back into combat. 
Churchill believed that three major problems would emerge as soon as the 
Nazi aerial attack commenced . The first was ensuring the safety of the water 
supply. Not only would the water mains be shattered , but the sewer lines 
would also be smashed . The effluent of six million people posed a very 
serious health risk if disposal facilities and sewer pipes became inoperative. 
The system did in fact break down in early October, 1940. Churchill records 
that raw sewage had to be pumped directly into the Thames followed by 
massive amounts of chemicals in order to mitigate the threat. 
The second fear was that there would be an outbreak of communicable 
diseases due to the crowding of millions of people into small , damp shelters . 
Fortunately, no epidem ics occurred and , "the fact remains that during this 
rough winter the health of the Londoners was actually above the average."73 
The third anticipated dilemma was a shortage of glass. Blast concussions 
easily shattered glass within a very wide radius of an explosion . With the 
approach of winter, the lack of protection from cold and rain might weaken 
the health of the populace. The substitution of other building materials was 
quickly implemented and most survivors suffered no worse than in a typical 
winter. 
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From a more strategic perspective, the Prime Minister was confronted 
by even more dire circumstances. Great Britain was less populous then 
Germany but economically possessed about the same strength. The Nazis 
however, had begun to rearm much earlier and relied less on long lines of 
overseas communication. Germany also benefited from the resources of her 
ideologically similar partners , Italy and Japan, and engaged in active trading 
with nearby neutral countries such as Spain and Sweden . Swiss banks were a 
source of financing as well as a repository for both legitimate and confiscated 
cash and other valuables. After the conquest of France, all the raw 
materials, physical infrastructure, and industrial capacity of a great power 
was absorbed into the German war machine. England was supported by her 
colonies and trading partners but the sealanes had to be protected against 
the numerically small but lethal U·boat threat. The United States possessed 
the greatest economic potential but its prevalent isolationist attitude and 
woeful unpreparedness meant Churchill could be offered only limited 
assistance. 
The British War Cabinet had concluded in February 1940 that the 
country could not afford a long war of attrition. The Chancellor of the 
Exchequer calculated that Britain, "would exhaust its gold and silver reserves 
by December 1940, then go bankrupt. "74 To add to his burdens, Churchill 
faced the distinct possibility that if he continued to resist Nazi aggression , it 
could very well cost him the empire and even Britain 's status as a world 
power. When the bombing actually began , Churchill was almost relieved . 
Now he could focus on the task at hand and , at least temporarily, ignore the 
strategic implications of his defiance. 
74 Angus Ca lder. The Myth of the Blitz. (London, England: J . Cape Publishers. 
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DAILY LIFE DURING THE BLITZ 
The Luftwaffe could not inspire the degree of terror necessary to 
overcome the innate basic needs of the intended victims. After eleven 
stra ight days of bombing, eyewitnesses noted that, "women in particular were 
growing tougher; even crying was becoming rare. "75 As in most traumat ic 
events, survival "was the process of personal and family adjustment. "76 As 
much as possible, the locals continued their normal routine. Mail was 
delivered to homes, as was the daily paper. 
An excellent account of the struggle to continue the printing presses is 
offered in Fleet Street. Blitzkri eg Diary. Between September 20, 1940 and 
August 8 , 1941 , journalist Gordon Robbins recorded a weekly tabulation of 
the impact of the Blitz on his employer's publishing house. The enterprise, 
as was almost every other major publisher, was located on Fleet Street in the 
City of London . Fleet Street is the oldest section of London and is built upon 
an old creek bed that the Romans used as a campsite more then two 
thousand years ago. Robbins states that after two weeks of daily attacks, not 
a single issue had been lost and the printers became accustomed to adapting 
themselves to novel emergencies. Stocks of newsprint were destroyed 
forcing a drop in circulation and unexploded bombs snarled distribution . The 
performance of the staff, however, far exceeded expectations. After a 
fortnight , only one person asked for a leave of absence and another resigned 
and left London. Even after four weeks, 75% of the employees reported for 
duty before the regular start time of 9:30 am. Like most business, closing 
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hour was advanced to 4:30 PM. for the duration. As winter approached and 
sunset arrived earlier each evening, it was deemed prudent to allow extra 
time for workers to return home, eat dinner, enjoy a pint at the local pub and 
settle into the nearest shelter before the Luftwaffe arrived. 
By the end of the Blitz in late spring, 1941, one hundred and fifty 
members of the staff remained diligently at their posts out of an original 
contingent of two hundred and ten on the eve of the outbreak of war. Most of 
the reduction occurred early on when several of the young female staffers 
evacuated the city with their children . Only three had been killed or injured 
severely enough to be incapable of working. During the course of the trial , 
several people were granted temporary leave to care for dead or displaced 
family members or to recover from the shock of having their home destroyed. 
Absenteeism actually dropped from previous levels as survivors made a 
concerted effort to get to work. Robbins recalls very little grumbling and 
noted that, "bombed·out firms almost without exception , are not seeking 
fresh homes in the suburbs or farther afield but in the great City and indeed , 
as near as possible to their old addresses. "77 Numerous competing 
publishing firms domiciled in the same area are mentioned with some 
companies suffering worse causalities and damage and others less. Overall , 
Robbins' narrative appears very representative of the experiences of many 
people in the Fleet Street district. 
Even though there was damage to the infrastructure throughout the city, 
repairs were quickly instituted. The most difficult problems were caused by 
time delayed bombs. Reconstruction could not proceed while 500·pound 
bombs lay buried in the middle of a street or worse yet, lodged among gas 
77 Gordon Robbins. Fleet Street Blitzkrieg Diary. (London , England : Ernest Benn 
Limited . 1944). P. 56 . 
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and water lines several feet underground. Many eyewitness accounts 
describe unexploded bombs and the ensu ing disruption. Transportation , heat, 
water, and electricity were often interrupted but not everywhere in London 
and not all at once. Spot shortages naturally occurred but efficient repairs , 
inventory, and government and private charitable organizations helped 
smooth out the low points . 
The procurement of food supplies was given very high priority. Lord 
Woolton, born Fred Marquis, was assigned responsibility for the task and was 
determined that no one should go hungry. He imported huge quantities of 
food well before hostilities began. Stores were dispersed throughout the 
metropolitan area in well·fortified basements and cellars. Even if heavy air 
raids destroyed several of the depots, there would still be a plethora of 
caches remaining. Lord Woolton confidently declared during the peak of the 
blitz, "today, we have more basic stocks in this country than ever before. "78 
The situation never became dire leading one observer to quip, "there is no 
real shortage of anything that is a necessity, but we can't get a decent 
martini in London ."79 
ANALYSIS OF THE BLITZ · MANUFACTURING 
One of the most important indicators of German ineffectiveness was the 
continued pace of the manufacture of single engine combat aircraft. In June 
1940, British output reached 440 to 490 fighters a month and continued on 
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almost the same scale even under Luftwaffe attack.80 Although , in the three 
weeks before September 7, Fighter Command aircraft and aircrew losses far 
exceeded replacements, 81 the change in German tactics to exclusive 
nighttime raids allowed new production to replace Spitfires and Hurricanes 
lost in action. During the Battle of Britain , about one thousand, five hundred 
new fighters rolled off assembly lines to offset the approximately one 
thousand destroyed airframes.82 Luftwaffe efforts to disrupt fighter 
production were largely ineffective due to the location of most of the relevant 
factories. The Merlin engines that powered both Hurricanes and Spitfires, the 
only engine suitable for Britain 's frontline fighters ,83 were manufactured at a 
facility in Glasgow, Scotland and by the Ford Motor Company in Manchester. 
Another major industrial center was Merseyside, which included Liverpool, 
with small component factories scattered throughout the Midlands. Located 
outside the range of protective fighter escorts , German bombers were forced 
to attack alone. This fact meant that any daylight raids would be 
prohibitively expensive. Some night operations were conducted but the 
primitive state of medium bomber navigation rendered most efforts futile .84 
The number of sorties flown by German aircraft and the tonnage of high 
explosives and incendiaries dropped are as follows: 
August 4779 sorties 
September 7260 sorties 
October 9911 sorties 
November 
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4636 tons 
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9113 tons 
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December 3844 sorties 4323 tons 
January, 1941 2465 sorties 2424 tons 
February 1401 sorties 1127 tons 85 
As is evident, the heaviest activity was in October. The first part of the 
month was especially significant as that was when daylight attacks ended and 
the bombers flew only under the cover of darkness. The operational shift was 
in direct response to unacceptable attrition rates. Luftwaffe losses per 
combat sortie were 3% for fighters operating by day, 6% for German 
bombers in daytime but only 0. 7% at night.86 Accuracy was even more 
problematic in the dark making the chances of destroying targets of 
economic importance diminish as the battle progressed. 
Although Londoners' places of employment were somewhat more 
secure after the switch to night bombing, there was a trade-off. In the Blitz, 
"it became clear that loss of sleep was the major problem, outweighing all 
other distresses and anxieties. Sleep, or the lack of it, almost replaced the 
weather as a topic of conversation."87 It is most difficult to ascertain the 
exact loss of productivity during the almost two months of nightly raids . It is 
claimed that, "work never came to a standstill for more than a matter of 
hours in any industrial area ."88 Apparently, those residents "who have 
something to do with their hands are all right. Action seems to drive out 
fear"89 Besides the production of war material, it was not necessary for 
achieving victory except for the citizenry "to muddle through. "90 
85 Bekker., p. 255. No number for sorties flown is available for November, 1940. 
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As compared to pre-war estimates, the bombings were spectacularly 
unsuccessful in killing large numbers of people. By October 31, 1940, British 
civilian fatalities were about 23,000; plus over 30,000 seriously wounded .91 
Divided by the quantity of ordnance expended, fatalities were 0.8 per ton and 
total casualties 1.7 per ton. 92 For planning purposes, British civilian defense 
officials in 1937 had projected a death rate of 17 per ton with the number of 
total causalities estimated to be 50 per ton. The percentage of the work 
force killed was far too low to harm the economy. 
Assuming that the 1.5 million evacuees from the pre-Blitz population of 6 
million Londoners were non-productive in an economic sense, i.e., young 
mothers, children, and the elderly, the casualty rate for those remaining was 
l~ss then 1.2%. The pool of unemployed easily filled any gap created due to 
enemy action. 
IMPACT ON CIVILIANS 
Clearly the Nazis failed to achieve their goals. Manufacturing had not 
been dislocated, London on the whole was still standing, and not enough 
civilians were being killed fast enough. The overwhelming desire of those 
remaining to stay alive by leaving the city was not in evidence. The human 
targets had adjusted to a new pattern of living and were not terrorized 
enough to seek alternatives other than to carry on. 
England had anticipated being bombed well before the Blitz. Physical 
arrangements had bee.n made during the late 1930's in the form of air raid 
shelter construction, the stockpiling of food and other strategic materials , 
and rehearsals for the shock of living under aerial bombardment. Continuous 
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discussions and the open debate over how best to survive created a level of 
expectation that conditions would definitely deteriorate during the course of a 
future war. Mentally and psychologically adjusted for a worst case scenario , 
when the bombing finally did begin diarist Mollie Pawter Downes described "a 
feeling of relief that the country is now united under a fighting leader who is 
not afraid to tell hard truths and to call for hard deeds when circumstances 
require them." 93 A remarkable reservoir of resilience was created that 
greatly assisted the majority in muddling through. The damage was 
substantial and the casualties horrible but the situation was much less grim 
than what many had anticipated. As long as the government continued to 
respond as best it could, dissidence remained almost non·existent and 
morale seemed to stabilize. 
Another aspect of the Blitz is harder to measure but just as important to 
contemplate . A sense of duty arose from the rubble and ashes of London. An 
auxiliary fireman offered an excellent example when relating his feelings that, 
"it was all new, but we were all unwilling to show fear, however much we 
might feel it. You looked around and saw the rest doing their job. You 
couldn't let them down, you just had to get on with it."94 Ordinary citizens 
coped by becoming air wardens and firewatchers. Physical activity diverted 
attention away from the self and towards the higher ideal of helping others. 
Most assignments were not glamorous, just people, "being busy, just doing a 
job of work, and knowing that it all depends on them." 95 The completion of a 
difficult task under the worst of circumstances led to a feeling of intense 
93 Mollie Pawter Downes. London War Notes 1939·1945. (N .Y., N.Y.; Farrar, 
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pride. Those who stayed in the city, "were normally, audibly proud to be 
there. They expressed contempt for the rest. "96 
There was even a display of jealousy among the rural populace towards 
Londoners. The sources are replete with examples of farmers and villagers 
visiting the beleaguered city and staying for several days for the purpose of 
sharing the risks. Certainly if the soft urbanities could survive, hardy non· 
Londoners could as well . Surviving the cataclysm led to the belief that no one 
had ever suffered more. It was a wonder to have endured at all.97 Outside 
one bar, it was noted, "no gas, no water but good spirits. "98 Signs displayed 
outside the gutted ruins of a beloved home or a shop that had belonged to 
the same family for generations summed up the attitude of many. Murrow 
wrote, "in a window, or what used to be a window, was one that read: 
shattered · but not shuttered. Nearby was another reading: knocked but not 
locked."99 Perhaps most indicative of the opinion of a large percentage of 
those who voluntarily stayed behind and endured , was the saying, "we shall 
live hard, but we shall live."100 
Amid the destruction and slaughter, a most surprising sentiment arose 
that was totally unanticipated. Many Londoners concurred with the 
statement that, " I wouldn't live anywhere else. I have grown fonder of the 
place since the blitz began and I find it quite exciting."101 The feeling was 
echoed by others. One young lady confided , "the war was still reasonably 
new. It was exciting, a terrible thing to say but it was. After all, when you're 
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twenty three years old a stimulus is a stimulus. " 102 Another woman of the 
same age but different social background agreed . " It gave me excitement · I 
mean it's an awful thing to say, but it did , it gave me a lot of excitement, the 
raids I mean ." 103 A sense of camaraderie , of shared danger radiated among 
the inhabitants. Harrisson reported that in many communal shelters the 
denizens "nearly always built up into a steady pattern of ' regulars ,' 
reminiscent of the public bar in a local pub in the same sort of district in 
peacetime ." 104 Other witnesses wrote that , "London came to resemble a 
small town . There 's something of a frontier atmosphere about the place ." 105 
American journalist Quentin Reynolds commented that "people are actually 
living in London . They 're dying too, but they're getting twenty-four hours a 
day of living first. " 106 
The breakdown of socioeconomic barriers also contributed to the novelty 
of the situation . "Class distinction, dignity, and even financial prestige are 
hard to maintain in an air-raid shelter at three o'clock in the morning. " 107 
For most, sleeping on a subway platform was another new experience. The 
thrill of the Blitz even usurped the pursuit of money. Reynolds noted that 
"nobody talks about it. People who've had their homes or offices bombed will 
tell you about it, but they never think to tell you what the loss amounted to, 
whether it was so many tens or hundreds of pounds ." 108 Everyone shared the 
same risks but the young discovered a considerable stimulus in the 
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excitement and even a sense of freedom : in most young people there is a 
happy streak of anarchy. 109 
Opposed to the bleak 1937 forecast of the Mental Health Emergency 
Committee, there was no increase in insanity: there were fewer suicides: 
drunkenness declined by over 50%, and the number of persons with neurotic 
illnesses or mental disorders attending clinics and hospitals actually 
declined .110 Arrests for intoxication in London fell from 20,000 in 1937 to 
an estimated 9000 in 1940. Perhaps drunkenness became too expensive a 
luxury to enjoy as the war ground on even though nearly everyone was 
employed and making money. More likely, the sacrifices necessary to ensure 
survival created a more sobering, less celebratory atmosphere. 
It was not uncommon for survivors to have fond memories of the ordeal. 
Especially popular as souvenirs were the spent shell casings from anti·aircraft 
guns. As a memento, Londoners , "rather touchingly, collected the lethal , 
white·hot shell fragments which throughout that winter clattered and sparked 
into their streets . These lumps of gashed steel are still to be seen on many a 
mantelpiece. " 111 
RESULTS OF THE BLITZ 
Most theories exposed for the first time to real world conditions yield 
observed results qu ite distinct from the original estimates. Neither Great 
Britain as a whole nor London specifically was incapacitated by the Blitz. 
Casualties were less then 5% of the forecasted aggregate and the long· term 
psychological effect was negligible. Manufacturing capability was reduced 
immediately after a raid but usually recuperated within two days. Priorities 
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were assigned to those industries most important to the war effort and fire 
suppression and damage control concentrated appropriately. The production 
of single engine fighters remained steady throughout the course of the battle 
and of whom Churchill praised as 'the few' , only 420 Fighter Command 
pilots were killed , missing, or captured. 112 The Luftwaffe could call upon a 
pool of 10,000 tra ined military pilots while Fighter Command could add only 
fifty each week to its complement of 1450.113 
There is no doubt that in urban areas subject to attack, city services 
were stressed and material damage sustained. It is also true that 
periodically older, decrepit homes were razed so that new structures could be 
built. Of some 13,000,000 private homes in 1939, nearly 4,000,000 were 
damaged (1,500,000 in London), and about 220,000 totally destroyed. But 
it must be remembered that this was nothing new, only the continuation of a 
trend which caused 245,272 houses to be demolished or closed from April 
1934 to March 1939, over a million persons moved without a bomb to speed 
the process. 114 Often damage was simply a case of blown·out windows and 
was not structural in nature. Gas, water, sewage, and electrical infrastructure 
was often destroyed in some places but not throughout all of London 
simultaneously. Pieces of the system were patched together with undamaged 
parts so that su rvivors could always find water and shelter, even if they had to 
search for awhile. The cold of winter in drafty homes and shelters combined 
with the strain of war, was supposed to result in massive outbreaks of disease 
and sickness . Fortunately, "there was no influenza epidemic, no diphtheria 
epidemic, no great increase in respiratory diseases such as tuberculosis. In 
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fact, the health of the shelters does not appear to have suffered at all during 
the months spent in the stuffy, crowded arches and tubes."115 Starvation did 
not occur because, "the distribution of food stocks was carried out with great 
competence by the Ministry in question and only very rarely were there 
mistakes made and people left without food ."116 Even alcohol , "another near 
essential in times of danger and protracted strain , was not so hard to f ind . 
The pubs had plenty of beer, but there was a shortage of glasses. " 11 7 
Eventually, the Nazis realized that the war could not be won by 
strategic air attack alone but Goering would not admit that the German 
Luftwaffe lacked the power to do so. 118 Deep underground tube stations and 
so named Anderson family shelters that were half buried in the backyard 
garden, offered good protection against the lightweight bombs deployed 
during the Blitz . In 1940, 99% of the bombs dropped weighed 250 
kilograms or less, the 250 kilo and the 50 kilo high explosive bomb being the 
standard models.119 A few 1000 kilo bombs were introduced but not enough 
to achieve the desired outcome. The laws of physics dictate that, "a 1000 
kilo bomb does far more damage than four of 250 kilo each, and a 2,500 kilo 
bomb is worth much more than fifty weighing 50 kilos. "120 
Douhet's theory stated that a small number of bombers could effectively 
destroy a city. During the Blitz, the Luftwaffe launched enough aircraft on 
what should have been an adequate number of sorties to generate the desired 
effect. The reason for the discrepancy was the inadequate mass of high 
explosives contained in each bomb. Douhet consistently applied a standard 
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of each bomber delivering enough ordnance, "to destroy a surface 500 
meters in diameter."121 He defined a target as supply depots, industrial 
plants, warehouses, railroad centers, and population centers . A 500 meter 
swath of destruction might be achieved in a conflagration of incendiary 
bombs among wooden structures, but could not happen as easily if the target 
was constructed of heavy masonry, as was the case in the colder climate of 
northern Europe. It was discovered that a 1000 kilo bomb left an impact 
crater only 25 meters wide even if the bomb was dropped from very high 
altitude. When exploded in an urban sett ing, the walls of stoutly constructed 
buildings contained much of the blast. Not even the end of the war saw 
conventional bombs of sufficient yield that could destroy a target within a 
500 meter radius from the point of impact. It is critical to note that the lack 
of destructive power contained in each bomb was the reason Douhet's theory 
could not be immediately validated. A 'conventional' bomb did not exist 
during World War II that cold destroy a target within a 500 meter radius . 
Another revelation was that the attacks were not concentrated enough into 
a single geographic space. It is helpful to remember that because, "London 
is a huge sprawling city, there is nothing like a continuous rain of bombs. A 
hundred planes overhead doesn't mean that they were all here at the same 
time- a few bombs will come whistling down, then silence again." 122 
Bombing accuracy even during the day was entirely inadequate. Anti -aircraft 
fire was not very effective at bringing down the enemy but contributed greatly 
to breaking up the formations of bombers. Forced to constantly adjust speed 
and altitude and climbing higher than what the bombardiers wished, the 
attackers surrendered a large degree of accuracy. 
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Another result of evasive maneuvering and excessive altitude was higher 
fuel consumption. The Luftwaffe was designed for short and medium-range 
sort ies . Any deviation from a straight and level flight plan limited time over 
the target and further reduced the operating range of the aircraft. Barrage 
balloons also played an important role in disrupting pinpoint dive bombing 
attacks . Initially the tethering cables were constructed of material lacking the 
strength to retain balloons in windy conditions. The same weakness reduced 
the effectiveness of the balloons in protecting sensitive targets . A steel cable 
could slice off the wing of a low flying bomber which forced attackers to drop 
their payload from greater heights. Once the deficiency was corrected, the 
Stukas were denied their most effective and deadly tactic . Even after a full 
month of the Blitz, "none of the bridges across the Thames has been hit , 
neither has the towering Battersea Power Station just across the river on 
Whitehall. " 123 Also , navigation devices were primitive and were only 
meaningfully effective during the raid on Coventry. Radio frequencies were 
easily jammed and resulted in far too great a margin of error even when 
working under optimum conditions . Camouflage and decoy fires burning in 
the countryside also were helpful in misdirecting the flight plans of the 
intruders . 
The low density of structures in London frustrated the relatively simple 
task of area bombing a target several miles in length running along both 
sides of a major river . At that time, "London as a whole was the least built -up 
city in the world. Gre-ater London consisted of no less than 90% parks, 
streets, playing fields and so on and only a tenth was houses. " 124 At the 
height of the blitz, it was estimated that it would still take forty years at the 
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present rate of bombing, to wipe out London. 125 The city was too spread out 
and the intensity of the attack inadequate to deliver Douhet's single massive 
blow. Bomber crews blinded by searchlights and distracted by anti ·aircraft 
fire during the night and hunted by fast and agile Hurricanes and Spitfires on 
day time sorties, could not cluster their payloads into a compact enough 
pattern to maximize blast damage. 
In the aftermath of the Blitz, the reconstruction of devastated areas 
became a very delicate issue. First priority was to repair gas, electrical, and 
sewer lines. The second order of business was to clear away debris so as to 
allow transportation and pedestrian movement to return to normal patterns. 
There was substantial debate about the next course of action. Some citizens 
saw an opportunity among the wreckage. They were very upset of course 
over the destruction of national treasures and monuments, however; it was 
also true that, "a good deal that wasn't precious but only unhygienic, 
inconvenient, and an offence to civic pride has also gone down in the 
flames. " 126 The Luftwaffe had inadvertently cleaned the slate. It became 
possible to build a new city upon the ruins of the old. Even the destroyed 
monuments could be resurrected on more convenient sites thereby 
permitting easier access for both locals and tourists. Renovation had to 
comply with the strictest guidelines, with the original plans as a template, but 
a small variance in geographic location was not seen to be damaging to the 
integrity of the building. 
To preservationists, any change in the status quo was nothing short of 
blasphemy. They desired to restore London to as close to the exact pre·Biitz 
look as humanly possible. The Parliament House, the Wren churches, and 
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every other major structure damaged or reduced to rubble was to be rebuilt 
as was and in the same location. Any deviation was construed as unpatriotic 
and tacit admission of Nazi success in damaging England 's prestige and 
historical legacy. 
Churchill deferred the final decision to the post·war government. He did 
however, stress the importance of "repairing existing buildings which are not 
seriously but only slightly damaged." 127 The immediate impact was the 
wholesale replacement of shattered windows. It was estimated that the 
highest percentage of air·raid injuries were caused by fly ing glass.128 To 
help as many homeowners as much as possible, a more damage resistant 
brand of window was offered as well as the crews needed to install them. 
Another technique implemented to protect buildings and homes was a 
government edict demanding that all attics had to be cleared of any 
flammable material. Experience had shown that the worst area for an 
incendiary bomb to land was on a roof. Fire fighting equipment had great 
difficulty ascending the heights to the top of London's buildings and 
apartment flats . Spotting the mark of each bomb was complicated by the 
nooks and crannies inherent in many of the old buildings as well as by smoke 
and dust. Cleaner attics offered less combustible material with which to fuel 
an inferno and easier access for firefighters and rescue squads. 
The Blitz revealed that a populace cannot be so easily cowed . 
Approximately one·fourth of Londoners fled the city either before or soon after 
the Blitz began. The vast majority of those who stayed survived the 
onslaught unscathed. Almost everyone experienced some degree of 
discomfort and hardship but few residents were actually broken mentally. 
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Many stayed in place out of a sense of duty to country and peers. The 
haunting specter of the Great Depression was such a vivid memory that 
occas ional bombs inspired less trepidation than unemployment. The pride of 
survivors and the exh ilaration of some to be living in danger were emotions 
that were never part of the calculation of aerial bombardment theorists. Too 
late, the Luftwaffe realized that a resolute urban population, often residing in 
shelters , needed to be attacked more frequently, more accurately, and wi t h 
much more destructive power. The vast majority of sort ies flown and tonnage 
of bombs dropped occurred from August to December, 1940. The short 
duration of the Blitz and the lack of explosive power in each bomb doomed 
the German effort to destroy the British cities. The successful prosecution of 
a strategic air campaign required substantially more material damage and 
must kill a far greater number of people. German tactics, ordnance, and 
types of delivery platforms were shown to be insufficient. The Blitz was the 
first example of a sustained , concentrated air campaign . It was more than 
just a single raid as absorbed by Nanjing, Rotterdam and most of the Spanish 
cities. Proponents realized that the predicted consequences were less severe 
then originally theorized. It was however, only the first attempt. The teachers 
were soon to experience the wrath of the pupils. 
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Chapter Four 
THE SECOND TRIAL: GERMANY 
As 1941 progressed, the number of sorties flown against the British 
steadily declined . Hitler had decided even before the Blitz started that the 
Soviet Union was his next target. The Luftwaffe was slowly withdrawn and 
redeployed south and east. German thrusts were directed towards 
Yugoslav ia, Greece and the island of Crete . The purpose was to solidify the 
center and southern flank of Europe in order to serve as a base for the three 
pronged attacks against the Russians. The preliminary operation was six 
weeks behind schedule but was successfully completed. 
On June 22, 1941, Operation Barbarossa was initiated and the blitzkrieg 
headed east. Germany had been the cause of Stalin's most egregious 
misjudgments ever since the Bolsheviks had expected the world revolution to 
start there only to see the German workers let them down. 129 A desperate 
Stalin demanded from Great Britain the immediate opening of a second front 
so as to relieve pressure on the staggering Soviet Union. Winston Churchill 
was a sworn enemy of communism and never trusted Stalin but was 
concerned most about the Nazis . If Germany triumphed in the east, her 
victorious armed forces would no doubt be shifted back to France to once 
again menace the home island. 
By mid·summer 1941, Churchill surveyed a world wherein tyranny was 
of almost biblical proportions. All of Europe had fallen under the boot of 
dictatorship. Spain was governed by Franco, the winner of the Spanish civil 
war. The original fascist, Mussolini , held sway in Italy. The Nazis controlled 
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France and the remainder of the western and central part of the continent. 
The Soviet Empire, spanning twelve time zones, trembled under the 
oppression of Stalin and the communists . Japan was ruled by a military junta 
under the guidance of a 'divine ' emperor and had been subjugating Ch inese 
territory since 1931. The only other great power that England could turn to 
for assistance was the United States. Unfortunately, for almost two years , 
the ' last great hope for democracy' was burying its collective head in the 
sand while Great Britain defended without Allies, the bulwarks of freedom . 
Churchill needed to somehow help the Russians but he also knew that he was 
still alone. 
An appraisal of Great Britain's military situation did not suggest many 
alternatives. The roughly one·third million troops saved at Dunkirk had lost 
all of their heavy equipment and transport. Even if they could safely navigate 
through U·boat infested waters and be introduced into the Russian front, the 
impact would be insignificant due to the size of the theater both 
geographically and in number of soldiers engaged. A cross channel foray was 
not practical at the time because of a lack of manpower reserves and a 
shortage of landing craft. Another limitation was that control of the air over 
the proposed invasion fleet had not been established. The British navy had 
escorted much needed supplies especially trucks, on the England to 
Murmansk PQ resupply convoys, but was incapable of attacking Germany 
directly. The only realistic option remaining was to deploy Bomber 
Command in a strategic mode. The concept was grudgingly accepted by 
Stalin that, "the British could, as Churchill put it, only 'pay our way by 
bombing Germany." ' 130 Neither ground nor naval forces could be brought to 
130 Richard Overy, Why the Allies Won. (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 
1995), p. 102 
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bear anytime in the near future . "For the moment, bombing constituted the 
Second Front. " 131Two engine aircraft had already been active deep inside the 
Third Reich since August 25 , 1940 on miss ions to provoke Hitler into 
retaliatory raids against Brit ish cities. Due to the extraordina ry distance 
between air bases in England and Berlin , the initial raids in autumn of 1940 
were very light. The average attack, "was carried out by twenty to thirty 
machines coming over in waves with intervals of almost a half hour 
between ." 132 Hurting the pride of the Germans by periodic sorties was 
enough to prod Hitler into ordering the redirection of Luftwaffe efforts 
towards the bait of London. In 1941, much more was demanded by Stalin 
and expected by Churchill. 
During the Blitz, the main concern of the R.A.F. was survival . Bomber 
counterstrikes caused some damage but, "there is nothing in Berlin yet that 
begins to compare with it. Such destruction as was done there was scattered 
widely over the city ." 133 Only after night raids against London slackened 
could any serious attention be given to shifting from defense to offense. Even 
at the height of the Blitz planning was being formulated for bringing 'war to 
the war makers'. Churchill best summarized British offensive strategy when 
he declared that, "we shall bomb Germany by day as well as by night in ever· 
increasing measure, casting upon them month by month a heavier discharge 
of bombs , and making the German people taste and gulp each month a 
sharper dose of the miseries they have showered upon mankind ." 134 The 
order issued on October 30 , 1940 committed Bomber Command to a, "policy 
of direct attack upon the German people in their cities as well as upon 
131 Ibid ., p. 103. 
132 Frederick Oechsner, This is the Enemy. (Boston , Massacf1usetts: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1942), p. 214. 
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industrial and military installations in or near them."135 The most important 
targets were oil facilities, particularly during periods of clear weather and 
sufficient moonlight when accuracy would be aided by visual sightings. It was 
also recognized that some effort would continue to be well used against 
marshaling yards and they knew that Bomber Command would have to 
contribute to the war at sea and in the air by occasional attacks on such 
targets as submarines and aerodromes. 136 
A list of major cities and specific objectives was compiled. It was 
believed that by attacking them repeatedly by forces of between 50 and 100 
bombers every few nights, 137 German towns would become uninhabitable and 
their factories would be destroyed. Tactics were amended however, after the 
German attack on Coventry in November 1940 when the whole center of the 
city, including its cathedral , had been ruined , and Bomber Command was 
instructed simply to aim at the centre of a city. 138 Churchill understood that 
there was a difference between surviving the Blitz and winning the war. Even 
though the Luftwaffe had re-directed its efforts to the east, victory was in no 
way assured . 
There were many problems to overcome before the R.A.F. could 
successfully execute its task. Initially, the shortcomings of the British were 
similar to that of their German counterparts . There were not enough aircraft 
per raid , "each plane could carry no more than a ton of bombs, the biggest 
bomb in Britain 's arsenal in mid-1940 was a 500 pounder, and the bombs 
were seldom concentrated on a single target but were distributed among half 
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a dozen or so. " 139 The foresight of pre-wa r bomber enthusiasts came to 
fruition as three new types of four engine heavy aircraft had already passed 
the design stage and were in production by late 1940. The Stirlings, 
Halifaxes, and Lancasters corrected the lack of payload inherent in the older 
models . More time was needed though to build up enough strength to 
seriously hamper the German economy. The British were optimistic that 
Bomber Command would succeed where the Luftwaffe failed partly because 
of the new generation of bombers. The British were fully committed to a long 
term campaign realizing that pressure must be continuously applied in order 
to effectively degrade the war making capability of the Nazis . The Blitz was 
executed more haphazardly employing aircraft not designed for the 
magnitude of the task. It was also understood that it was enormously 
expensive to build a fleet of four engine heavy aircraft. It is estimated that 
Bomber Command absorbed one-third of Britain's total war effort. According 
to Stephen Garrett, the resources committed to the bomber offensive were 
roughly equal to those given to all British land forces .14° First call on 
research and development, especially electronic technology, was reserved for 
the air war . Manning and training personnel was also quite costly and time 
consum1ng. Arthur Harris concluded that educating a member of a bomber 
crew required at least six months and cost some 10,000 pounds (British 
money) for each man, enough to send ten men to Oxford or Cambridge for 
three years. 141 
Recruiting from the limited manpower available at the time constituted 
another problem. British casualties in World War One decreased the number 
139 Ronald H. Bailey, The Air War in Europe. (Alexandria, Virgin ia: Time Life Books, 
1979), p. 31. 
140 Stephen Garrett. Ethics and Airpower in World War II: The British bombing of 
German Cities . (f\Jew York , f\Jew York : St . Martin's Press , 1993.) p. 49 . 
60 
of men reaching adulthood during World War Two. Demographics helped to 
bolster the argument for heavy bombers . A four·engine airplane could carry 
three times the payload of a light or medium machine and yet required only 
one pilot. Always the most difficult and responsible position, trained pilots 
were in great demand. To achieve the number of bombers necessary to fully 
secure command of the air, it became necessary to limit the total number of 
other bomber type aircraft. 
Americans and other foreigners were heavily recruited to satisfy the 
demands for fighter pilots but Bomber Command desired to maintain as 
much of an aii·British crew as possible. A bomber crew was a team that 
needed to work together if they were to survive. Friction and personality 
conflicts had to be kept to a minimum . In contrast , fighter pilots operated 
without passengers and the men were generally younger and more 
aggressive. Textbooks of fighter tactics insisted that pairs of planes act in 
concert in combat with younger pilots acting as wingmen to protect more 
experienced fliers. In combat, however, discipline often disintegrated as 
engagements broke down to one·on ·one dogfights . A far greater sense of 
individuality was tolerated among fighter pilots . Several men functioning 
together as one was an absolute necessity in a bomber and it was felt the 
greater the level of homogeneity among the crew, the better . 
For German bomber crews, navigation was reasonably simple. Flight 
time from bases in occupied France to English targets was quite short with 
the average period between bombers crossing the coast and bombs away 
being approximately seven minutes .142 The City, the financial district of 
London , was located on a meander of the Thames River. Assuming at least 
141 Sir Arthur Harris. Bomber Offensive . P. 98. 
142 FitzGibbon. The Winter of the Bombs. p.l5 . 
61 
some break in the cloud cover, bombardiers could usually locate such a 
prominent geographic feature. If all else fa iled, "London's approximate 
position was easily detected, even from very far away, owing to the 
concentration of searchlights. There were a number of recognizable 
positions, with groups of massed lights, which our more experienced bomber 
crews soon learned to use as navigational aids" recalled several German crew 
members. Lost or in need of establishing a more exact fix , "we would attract 
their attention, and make them illuminate by briefly switching on our 
navigational lights, or firing tracers, or shooting off our guns. 11143 
Bomber Command faced a more daunting challenge. Flying one 
thousand, five hundred miles round trip at night, including long stretches 
over enemy controlled territory, especially during the capricious winter 
weather commonly experienced in northern Europe, was a vastly more 
complex process. It became necessary to utilize different kinds of radio 
waves to guide the pilot over the target. As a result, the level of electronic 
warfare progressed rapidly as hostilities continued . Each advancement by 
one side was soon countered by the other. In the case of chaff, strips of 
aluminum were cut into precise dimensions to reflect one·half of the radio 
wave frequency most commonly emitted by German detection gear. 
Dumped from aircraft at specific altitudes, the effect was to disguise the true 
intent of a raid by obfuscating and overloading target acquisition radar 
screens with an overabundance of return signals . The concept was 
discovered during pioneering experiments conducted by the inventors of 
British radar. It was not deployed until later in the conflict because of the 
concern that the Nazis would use the weapon against their foes. 
143 Ibid., p.l46. Compiled from different accounts of German bomber crews. 
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The Battle of Britain witnessed only minimal deployment of fighters to 
intercept incoming invaders after dark. Hurricanes were preferred because of 
the better visibility from their cockpit and wider landing gear track which was 
safer in night landings. 144 The Germans equipped Me·110s and Junkers-88s 
with airborne radar and deployed them along the Kammhuber Line, a vertical 
defensive line guarding the western air approaches to the Reich . Night 
fighters were extremely effective in knocking down aircraft from the bomber 
stream but only if they could find the target flying in their assigned space. 
British tactics were to spoof, jam, and deceive the defenders in any way 
possible and if still discovered, corkscrew away as quickly as possible. 
Confounded by searchlights and anti·aircraft fire, British bombing 
accuracy was highly problematic during the initial stage of the counter 
offensive. In mid·1941, "the percentage of bombs landing within five mile of 
their aim point was only 31% overall, and just 9% for targets in the Ruhr. 
Also, 34% of the bombers dispatched did not release bombs on target, 
mostly because they could not find them. " 145 After particularly heavy losses 
during a raid on November 7, 1941, the Air Staff had to face another 
unpleasant conclusion. Reich air space was becoming impossible to cross 
without sustaining casualties that would destroy planes and crews much 
faster than they could be replaced. The fact was that, "among bombers that 
headed for the Ruhr, risking the most formidable sector of the Kammhuber 
Line, the loss rate was a frightening 21%."146 Churchill made the painful 
decision to suspend operations over Germany for the rest of that winter 
except for small forces sent only to the nearest targets and only in the most 
144 Heilenday. Battle of Britain. p. 18. 
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favorable weather. 147 Not even the more conserva ti ve deployment of 
Bomber Command corrected the problem. A study of the data revealed that 
by February of 1942, "40% of the aircraft did not release bombs on their 
targets , and tha t those that did release had only 45% of thei r bombs within 
five miles of the target. " 148 
Britain was irrevers ibly committed to a strategic air campaign aga inst 
Germany. It was the only practical option available to strike back and relieve 
some of the pressure from the tottering Soviets . By early 1942, however, the 
sacrifice of men and machines had achieved only the scattering of 40,000 
tons of bombs on the German countryside with negligible impact. 149 
BRITISH ADAPTATIONS 
Intensive debate during the 1941-1942 winter bombing slow down , led 
to a re -evaluation of doctrine and to the assignment of a new commander. 
Arthur Harris was appointed February 22 , 1942 and led Bomber Command 
until the end of hostilities . Instead of concentrating on specific targets inside 
cities , the revised objective was to directly attack "the enemy's civil 
population and in pa rticular, the industrial workers. 11! 50 Harris did not 
adhere to Douhet's premise that the will of the German people would collapse 
after a few intense raids . With the concentration camp round the corner, his 
bel ief was that Germany's material abil ity to wage war was what counted and 
this could be undermined only by heavy and persistent bombing of industrial 
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centres. 151 It was not Harris's strategy to bomb Germany simply to avenge 
the Blitz. The impetus for change was political in nature, emanating from 
British civilian leaders who were more enthusiastic about the shift to area 
bombing than most sen ior officers of the R.A.F. 152 Area bombing entailed the 
abandonment of any pretense of accuracy. Prominent landmarks such as 
rivers or church steeples in the middle of towns served in a very general 
sense as aiming points. Payloads were dropped without regard for military 
targets. The purpose was not to damage the war machine as much as to 
harm and demoralize the civilian population. Elected officials were 
continuously besieged by their constituents to take the war to the Nazis. 
Angered by the destruction of their homes, neighborhoods, and beloved 
cities , the cry arose for tangible proof of pain being inflicted upon their 
tormentors. RAF commanders were sensitive to the concerns of the public 
but also understood that Bomber Command operated within the context of 
very limited resources in terms of both material and manpower. Any 
commitment of blood and treasure had to yield the highest possible return in 
damage to the enemy. It was recognized that daylight bombing was more 
accurate but also more costly. The switch to night operations was the result 
of intense political pressure as well as the material and manpower limitations 
under which the British labored. The Nazis had to be attacked with as few 
British causalities as possible. If German cities were destroyed and civilians 
killed, that was the price Germany must pay for Hitler bombing the home 
island. 
The rationale behind the new tactic was that the most efficient manner 
in which to impair German economic activity was to make civilians homeless. 
151 Overy., p. 113. 
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It was accepted as fact that the destruction of one's home was worse, "than 
having friends or even relatives killed . " 153 From such a premise, forecasts 
were created based on previous observations and anticipated events . 
German attacks on Britain showed that a ton of bombs dropped on a built-up 
area smashed twenty to forty dwellings , making one hundred to two hundred 
people homeless .154 The typical British bomber survived fourteen sorties , 
dropping forty tons of explosives and incendiaries and therefore, making four 
thousand to eight thousand people homeless. Multiply the per plane average 
by the anticipated number of aircraft expected to be built and by mid-1943, 
Bomber Command could render homeless most of the people of the fifty -
eight German cities that had over 100,000 inhabitants. 155 Once the decision 
was finalized the goal of 'de-housing' the German industrial worker was 
effectively set in concrete for the remainder of the war .156 
Within five weeks of his appointment, Harris was ready to demonstrate 
his unique and aggressive style . On the night of March 28, 1942, the 
ancient city of Lubeck was attacked. Lubeck was chosen specifically because 
it was largely of medieval construction so that the buildings were highly 
flammable .157 The absence of any appreciable factories or industry placed it 
very low on the priority list of places to be defended . The result was the 
complete destruction of the inner city, heavy civilian casualties , and Bomber 
Command losses of only 4%. Encouraged by the outcome, Harris ordered 
another large-scale operation against the urban population of Germany. He 
was determined to demonstrate exactly what his command could do if given 
the necessary resources . Every available aircraft whether combat ready, 
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undergoing maintenance, or utilized in tra ining was assembled. Harris 
believed that a successful mission would stop the disbursement of new 
British aircraft to Coastal Command and the Mediterranean theatre. New 
technical innovations for mass raids and the introduction of the upgraded 
Gee navigational system were also considered important tools that needed to 
be employed . 
On the evening of May 30, 1942, one thousand and eighty bombers were 
directed towards Cologne in the Ruhr Valley. Experience gained in the early 
stages of the war determined that on clear nights with more than a quarter 
moon, individual buildings could be distinguished at heights up to three or 
four thousand feet, small towns could be seen from four to six thousand feet , 
and small rivers were visible to six to eight thousand feet. 158 Unfortunately 
for Cologne, the sky that night was cloudless and a full moon shone on the 
broad Rhine River. Instead of a bomber stream spread out over hundreds of 
miles sporadically dribbling payload throughout the night, the raid lasted 
barely ninety minutes. The fighters assigned individually to a single box were 
instantly overwhelmed by the large number of attackers and were unable to 
react effectively. Cologne's civil defenses were likewise incapable of 
combating the massive tonnage of bombs concentrated for once into a 
relatively small area in a short period of time. Even Propaganda Minister 
Joseph Goebels was disturbed enough after a personal inspection to write in 
his diary that, "the effects of bomb warfare are horrible when one looks at 
individual cases. " 159 Two years after the raid , only 20,000 of a prewar 
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population of 800,000 still remained in the ru ins. 160 Any further bombing of 
Cologne was considered uneconomical. 
If the destruction of Cologne wasn 't unsettling enough for the German 
High Command, the ordeal of Hamburg el icited near pan ic. Seven times in 
nine days during August , 1943 the R.A.F. and American Air Force raided the 
city by night and day respectively. For the first time, chaff (code named 
Window to the British), was deployed in order to confuse the defense. 
"Bomber losses on the first night were only twelve out of eight hundred " 161 
(seven hundred ninety·one total bombers according to German sources). 
Hot and dry conditions made timber more vulnerable than normal to 
incendiaries and the lack of an aggressive fighter response allowed a compact 
pattern of bomb hits. Ack-ack was also limited due to the failure of radar 
control to see through the clouds of chaff and determine the accurate 
altitude, speed and direction of the raiders . 
This combination of factors created a new and rare phenomenon, the 
firestorm. As the individual fires merged, cold air rushed in to feed the 
inferno. Winds accelerated to "speeds of one hundred to one hundred fifty 
mph , incinerating people above and below ground." 162 British estimates were 
that at least fifty thousand were killed in this way and a million more fled 
from the city: half the houses were destroyed and more than half the 
rema inder damaged. 163 It was estimated that 40 million tons of rubble 
clogged the city 's center and in some areas of the city the total of fatal 
casualties among the inhabitants exceeded 30%. It was calculated that 
battle deaths among soldiers recruited from the city between 1939 and 1945 
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were only 13% higher then among Hamburg's bombing victims.164 German 
sources are more exact but no less dramatic; 30,482 inhabitants lost their 
lives, and 277,330 buildings· almost half the city· were reduced to ruins. 165 
Other accounts state that the true number of deaths was closer to 40,000 
and eight years were required to compile the accurate number. 166 
The total destruction of a city was close to being realized at Hamburg. 
Over one million citizens fled and did not return. Substantially more civilian 
deaths were inflicted upon Hamburg in nine days than were endured by Great 
Britain in the three and one·half month Bl itz. The basic services of water, 
gas, electricity and public transportation were completely shattered 
throughout the entire city. Major factories were not specifically targeted by 
the R.A. F. but, "the destruction of many small workshops and the general 
disruption probably cost the city 1.8 months of full war production. 
Production returned to 80% of the pre·attack level, but never did recover 
fully." 167 
Hamburg in early August, 1943 proved to be the acme of the big blow 
theory of conventional night terror bombing. After four years of war, accuracy 
had much improved but the placement of bombs delivered at night still could 
not match the results of daytime missions. Precision was not relevant as a 
firestorm engulfing all of downtown maximized the strategy of saturating an 
urban center with high explosives and incendiaries. Although manufacturing 
did not cease entirely, the economy was permanently degraded. The impact 
was so severe that it forced a change in German philosophy. After the second 
night raid on Hamburg, Goering instructed the chief of air supply, Field 
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Marshal Erhard Milch , that the aircraft industry would forthwith concentrate 
on defensive production. 168 
Less then three years after London's baptism by fire, improved directional 
finder systems, larger bombs, and heavier lift bombers resulted in the 
delivery of far more destructive power on target than the Luftwaffe could 
mount during its attempt to subdue England. Massive damage and 
casualties were inflicted but air strikes still had not concluded the struggle. 
Even with the assistance of freak weather conditions, mid·1943 technology 
was incapable of completely fulfilling the predictions of pre-war strategic 
bombing proponents. If a short offensive was not successful, perhaps a long-
term commitment could still persuade a great power to capitulate without 
military occupation of its territory. 
AMERICA COMES ON LINE 
By the time of the Hamburg debacle, most Germans knew that 
circumstances would worsen over time. The incredible blunder of declaring 
war on the United State shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
sealed the fate of the Axis . The natural resources and industrial capacity of 
the U.S., along with massive reserves of fresh manpower, guaranteed that 
any contest of attrition would work against the Nazis. The U.S. declared war 
on Japan December 8, 1941. No movement was directed to formalize 
hostilities against Germany until after Germany declared war on America first 
a few days later. Along with usurping his generals' decisions on the Russian 
front, it was Hitler's greatest mistake. 
American strategy in 1942 was to sortie large formations of four engine 
aircraft unescorted on daylight missions. The Norden bombsight was thought 
168 Bekker., p. 461. 
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capable of delivering ordnance precisely on target and had demonstrated 
such in production trials in the hot and dry climate of Texas. The bombers 
were designed to defend themselves all the way to the target and back and 
thus did not require fighter protection even in the day. In contrast, the 
British were already fully committed to area bombing at night. Their latest 
generation of fighters did not carry enough machine guns to ward off 
Luftwaffe attacks and the older Hurricanes and Spitfires lacked the range to 
fly deep penetration missions to Germany. Great Britain's industrial base 
was incapable of construct ing a bomber fleet large enough to absorb the 
losses inherent in daylight raids and perhaps most important, a shortage of 
men meant that not enough trained crews could be made available to man 
the aircraft even if enough were constructed . A compromise was reached 
wherein the British would continue to fly at night and the Americans during 
the day. Round the clock raids would deprive the defenders of sleep and 
more quickly eliminate the Luftwaffe and the aircraft industry that nourished 
it. As in most major wars, victory was not qu ick but achieved only after a 
long and arduous battle of attrition. 
American bomber losses skyrocketed as daylight missions extended past 
occupied France and into German airspace. By the end of 1943, the situation 
had deteriorated to the point where a halt in the bombing was necessitated . 
Time was needed in order to replace the large number of planes and aircrews 
lost in action. It was becoming increasingly clear that unescorted bombers, 
no matter how heavily.armed, could not adequately defend themselves 
against the Luftwaffe. Allied f ighters lacked the range to escort the bombers 
all the way to the target and back. Forced to return to their British airfields 
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upon reaching the German border, the Allied escorts could only watch in their 
rear view mirrors as the Luftwaffe pounced upon the unprotected bombers. 
In response, a major innovation occurred by the winter of 1943-44. 
American fighters were outfitted with disposable fuel tanks enabling them to 
escort the B·17s and B·24s anywhere over the Reich . The long range P·51 
Mustang was also rolled out in the same t ime frame. Luftwaffe day fighters 
no longer could harass the bomber formations with impunity. The accuracy 
of the Flying Fortresses and Liberators was already superior to their British 
cousins and as a result of greater protection became even more so. With the 
threat of fighter attacks greatly reduced , the build ·up of American bomber 
strength could increase more rapidly than expected . Another consequence 
was that the platform from which to deliver payloads became more stable as 
less evasive action had to be performed and fewer bombardiers released 
bombs early for the sake of self·preservation. The outcome was an 
exponential increase in the tonnage of explosives aimed ever more precisely 
at the economic fiber of Nazi Germany. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND TRIAL · CASUAL TIES 
During World War II, the death toll due to aerial bombardment for the 
greater German Reich exist ing on December 31 , 1942 (but excluding 
Bohemia and Moravia) was 635,000 including 570,000 German civilians. 169 
As for any aggregate casualty number presented for World War II, the above 
is inexact. It was not possible for Germany, Russia or Japan to accurately 
track the d isposition of individual citizens due to the sheer magnitude of 
death and the wholesale destruction of files and records . Even today, Soviet 
169 Bekker. , p. 564. 
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losses are calculated indirectly us ing stat istica l analys is of the gaps in 
demographic data . 
Roughly ten times as many German civilians were killed as British. It 
may be assumed that the latter were responsible for the vast majority of 
German casualties and not their American partners. Daylight attacks often 
caused collateral damage to inhabited areas close to the target and bombs 
were released indiscriminately when clouds and smoke obscured visual 
sightings . It was considered anathema to U.S. commanders , however, to 
fight all the way into Germany only to obliterate worker's homes. British 
opinion was that saturation bombing was meant to destroy the Nazis' 
industrial potential and civilian deaths were an accepted part of the equation . 
Harris 's attitude can be gleaned from an incident in which he was pulled over 
for speeding. When the police officer saw who he was, he was politely 
reminded to , "be careful , you might kill somebody." Harris replied , "my dear 
man, I am paid to kill people. " 170 
Before "Bomber" Harris is condemned for offending modern 
sensibilities , the suffering endured by London and the other urban centers in 
Great Britain must be remembered . The Blitz was not the only period during 
which England suffered aerial attack. During the entire course of the war, 
sporadic raids were launched , mainly against London , to demonstrate that 
Germany could still strike back at its enemy. Little attempt was made to 
target specific military objectives and ordnance was scattered 
indiscriminately onto .the cities . The most egregious example of futility was 
the V-1 and V-2 programs. The former were launched twelve days after the 
successful D-Day operation in the general vicinity of London. A few weeks 
later , the rocket propelled V-2s began to rain down on the .capital. Over one 
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ton of high explosives were carried as payload on each of the weapons. The 
tremendous blast caused by a V·2 had an even worse psychological impact 
because it arrived unannounced. The V·1 was noted for the buzz of its air 
fueled jet engine and then the eerie silence after it ran out of fuel and 
descended to earth. The V·2 traveled faster then the speed of sound and 
exploded before the victims knew it was coming. Beginning shortly after the 
July 20, 1944 failed attempt on Hitler's life, it was difficult for Londoners to 
comprehend the purpose of the new weapons. The British had already 
demonstrated their determination and capacity to absorb punishment during 
the previous four and one·half years. With the end of the war so close, it was 
not appreciated being on the receiving end of new weapons whose only 
purpose was to kill and maim civilians . Churchill quickly recognized the 
severity of the new threat and pressured his field commanders to overrun the 
launching sites as quickly as possible. 
The Vengeance weapons served to harden the attitude of Bomber 
Command and give it the extra impetus to complete its mission. It became 
apparent that nothing could convince Hitler to stop attacking the home 
island. Destroying German cities and landing on the continent still did not 
stop the killing of women and children. Bomber Command and the civilian 
population saw no other way to alleviate the suffering. Arthur Harris had to 
relentlessly and without remorse bomb the Nazis until they unconditionally 
surrendered. Before the British are condemned, it is interesting to note the 
dichotomy in American public opinion. While pursuing a policy of precision 
bombing in Europe, "a poll on December 10, 1941 revealed that 67% of the 
population favored unqualified and indiscriminate bombing of Japanese cities 
with only 10% responding with an outright no. Subsequent surveys produced 
170 Baile . . 52 . 
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similar results ." 17 1 The reason for such opinions could be the fact that 
Germany had attacked England first , as Japan did to the U.S. Perhaps 
national self·preservation justified any means necessary to defeat aggression . 
MANUFACTURING 
It is extremely difficult to ascertain the extent of the economic damage 
inflicted by the R.A.F. and A.A. F. The biggest problem in establishing 
acceptable criteria is that there were no general grounds for agreement on 
how to weigh the effects of bombing on the German economy. 172 One 
method was to examine the German plans of production, subtracting actual 
from planned output. 173 Errors could occur though, unless it was known if 
the forecasts were realistic or only reflected wishful thinking. Another source 
is to review postwar efforts to discern accurate information from extant data. 
The third tool is to accept the conclusions of Albert Speer, the Minister of 
Munitions and War Production for the Third Reich. In any case, "the 
inadequacy of surviving German statistics make all estimates rough." 174 
Studying what was left, the U.S. Bombing Survey suggests that prior to 
the summer of 1943, the air war, "had had no appreciable effect either on 
munitions output or on the national economy in general." 175 By the end of 
1943, a total loss of Gross National Product had been sustained amounting 
to not more than 3 to 5%.176 The Survey concludes that, "bombings slowed 
down the expansion of output · in the first quarter of 1944 by as much as 
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10%." 177 Speer pegged the total figure of reduced armament manufacturing 
at 9 or 10% overall with aircraft 31% below forecasts and 35% under budget 
for tanks. 178 The actual production of major weapons for Nazi Germany from 
1939 to 1945 is as follows: 
1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Airc raft 
8295 10,247 11 ,776 15,409 24,807 39 ,807 7540 
U · Boats 
15 40 196 244 270 189 0 
Tanks 
1300 2200 5200 9200 17,300 22,100 4400 
Artillery 
2000 5000 7000 12,000 27 ,000 41,000 179 
A cursory review might suggest that despite all Allied efforts , there was no 
advantage to strategic bombardment. Upon further examination , however, 
several relevant factors are revealed. 
Like most countries , by the late 1930's Germany was emerging from the 
Great Depression . Rearmament provided employment for millions of 
destitute workers . After victory in Poland , Norway, and France, "a new found 
wealth of material goods· the spoils of war,"180 had flooded into the Reich , 
mainly from soldiers returning home on leave. After further conquests and 
with the whole of conti.nental Europe at her disposal , Germany was fast 
177 Ibid . 
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becoming an economic super-power. 181 The German Gross National Product 
was not a fixed number where output was already being maximized . If that 
were the situation, it would be quite easy to measure the effect of strategic 
bombing by comparing actual production versus the absolute limit. The 
reality was that industrial potential was far greater than that being utilized. 
The influx of raw materials, notably high-grade ore and oil from Eastern 
Europe, expanded the German war making capability far beyond its 
peacetime limit. 
Full worker mobilization was very late in coming and was not mandated 
until after the defeat at Stalingrad. In a speech given on February 18, 1943, 
Goebbels proclaimed , " it was ridiculous to have more than six million workers 
still turning out consumer products, 1.5 million German women still toiling as 
maids and cooks, and 100,000 restaurants and amusement centers still 
functioning almost as they had in 1939. " 182 Incredibly enough, not until 
August 24, 1944 was it dictated that, "in order to obtain a maximum output 
from home front workers, all government and private business offices will go 
on a sixty hour week. Civilians will further help to carry the soldier's load by 
temporarily giving up paid vacations ." 183 While American B-24's were being 
built one every sixty-nine seconds around the clock, Speer stepped up 
production but rarely put factories on a double shift. 184 The underlying 
problem was that Hitler, "did not consider economics as central to the war 
effort. Rather he stuck to the view that social character - willpower, resolve, 
181 Overy., p. 130. 
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endurance · was the prime mover; weapons mattered only to the extent that 
they could be married to the moral qualities of the fighting man" 185 
It is not possible to quantify the potential of a dynamic, expanding 
economic system in wartime. Therefore, a specific percentage being claimed 
as destroyed due to bombing cannot be accurately measured. Fortunately, 
there is enough surviving documentation to demonstrate that vital resou rces 
were redirected . The increase in the number of aircraft manufactured was 
truly dramatic especially in the teeth of Allied efforts to destroy the industry. 
A closer look, however, is necessary in order to comprehend the full situation. 
During the early years of the conflict, medium bombers, Stukas, and 
fighters were produced in roughly equal numbers for the purpose of 
supporting the entire spectrum of Wehrmacht operations. It has already been 
noted that at the beginning of Barbarossa (June 22, 1941) the German Army 
had the support of well over 50% of the whole German air force. At the end 
of 1943, the German Army had the support of less than 20% of the whole 
German air force. 186 The percentage drop illustrates the decision to 
concentrate manufacturing resources on fighter aircraft to counter the 
growing American daylight raids . Single engine Messerschmitt 109s and 
Focke Wulf 190s were much cheaper and easier to build than two engine 
bombers. Goering supposedly told Albert Speer, the Minister of Production , 
that Hitler would only ask how many aircraft are available, not what kind . 
The tactical impact over the Russian battlefield was immense. The 
Luftwaffe surrendereci a large measure of the undisputed air superiority it had 
won in the early stages of the campaign . German fighters could still 
challenge the increasing numbers of Soviet fighters and light bombers but 
185 Overy. , p. 206. 
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were unable to effectively disrupt Soviet offensive actions. The obsolete 
Stukas were outfitted with heavy cannon and given the role of tank destroyers 
but diminished as a threat to troop concentrations , bridges, and supply 
bottlenecks. Fewer bombers meant that German troops could rely less on 
support missions. At the same time, Soviet aircraft could increase the 
frequency of their attacks as well as accumulate and transport men and 
equipment with less German harassment. The reduced Luftwaffe tactical 
presence, especially in light and medium bombers, signaled a shift in air 
superiority by late 1943. By D-Day, June 6 , 1944, the Allies commanded the 
air over the battlefield in both western and eastern Europe. 
In other areas of military hardware, by 1944 one-third of all artillery 
production consisted of anti-aircraft guns; the anti -ai rcraft effort absorbed 
20% of all ammunition produced , one-third of the output of the optical 
industry, and between half and two-thirds of the production of radar and 
signal equipment. 187 The manpower situation also worsened. The estimates 
for 1944 were that 2,000,000 Germans were engaged in anti -aircraft defense, 
in repairing shattered factories and in generally cleaning up the 
destruction .188 
It was impossible to launch concentrated , sustained offensives when so 
much of a belligerent 's mil itary assets are in a defensive posture. It can 
never be known what Germany was capable of producing, but there is no 
doubt that the rate of growth in manufacturing was negatively affected by the 
air campaign. Dislocation and dispersal of factories and the loss of critical 
machinery was as devastating as was the reduced productivity of the work 
force. 
187 Ibid., p. 131. 
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War industries, however, were too diverse and large to be eliminated in 
a single stroke. When the ball bearing plants at Schweinfurt were attacked, 
there were adequate reserves of finished goods in inventory and enough 
unused floor space to minimize interruptions in the production schedule. But 
not even an infrastructure as well developed and defended as Germany's 
could withstand forever the increasing intensity of Allied raids. 
A targeted city or factory normally quickly regained much of its output after 
a raid. It was discovered however, that recuperative capacity after multiple 
bombings diminished. Employees might flee the affected area or become 
casualties. Even if a facility was undamaged, it might still remain idle if 
suppliers providing vital components were incapable of making timely 
deliveries. 
The cumulative and multi ·faceted aspect of round the clock bombing 
mitigated against much of the increase in manufacturing. In 1944, 25,860 
pursuit planes were constructed but, "in the same period the Luftwaffe put 
only 1200 of them into action . The rest were destroyed during 
transportation, bombed on the ground after delivery, or else could not be 
used for lack of runways or the fuel to get them into the air. 11189 The man 
responsible for supplying planes to the Luftwaffe , Field Marshall Erhard Milch, 
protested strongly at the number of brand new aircraft standing on the 
factory airfields of Messerschmitt. 190 He ordered the relocation and 
concealment of all finished product but while on personal inspection tours 
was, "confronted again and again by smoking ruins." 191 Not even the 
highest priority weapon system, the Vengeance missiles, could be safely 
189 Blond. , p. 89. Please note that the number of planes constructed is less then 
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brought into action . The transportation system that delivered V-ls to the 
field was vulnerable, allowing only about one-third of all V-ls produced to 
reach launch sites. 192 
It is far too simplistic to claim that the strategic air campaign against 
Germany was unsuccessful merely by demonstrating that a year to year 
acceleration in major armaments production was attained. A great power 
enmeshed in a global conflict requires an integrated industrial base with each 
component working seamlessly to support the war effort. By V-E Day, it was 
not yet possible to completely destroy a modern infrastructure nor all of a 
segment of one, but a high tonnage of heavy conventional bombs dropped 
with relative precision onto non-civilian and commercial targets was capable 
of severely degrading military capability. 
IMPACT ON CIVILIANS 
German non-combatants suffered ever greater privations as the war 
progressed. Initial German reaction was very similar to that of Londoners . 
A substantial percentage of the civilian population fled the target areas for 
rural safe havens. Those who remained attempted to adjust. "Some people 
never got used to the horrors; others came to accept them with a kind of 
numbness that surprised even themselves . " 193 Many city dwellers slept in 
work clothes so they could quickly dash from their home, to the shelter, and 
then to their place of employment (assuming it still existed). Public 
entertainment closed early and people went to bed right after dinner in order 
to get as much undisturbed sleep as possible . Food was cooked during the 
191 Ibid. 
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day in case gas lines were ruptured during the night and water was collected 
in bathtubs acting as private reservoirs. Eventual shortages of basic 
necessit ies and minor luxuries spurred innumerable creative substitutions. 
Some who fled returned to their homes, "because they m issed the spec ial 
camaraderie that developed among those under the bombs. It was horrific, 
and I know it may sound fool ish to say th is, but people were never so fr iendly 
or so good again ."194 Another survivor confided to her diary that, "her 
homesickness for Berlin , its fatalism, its generosity, its toughness , gets more 
and more acute. " 195 
Over time, the sense of excitement and novelty gave way to a much 
more pessimistic outlook. Fifteen months after the firestorm , one Hamburg 
resident wrote, "there is hardly a town still left intact and yet one becomes 
indifferent even to these atrocious ravages. For days we have had no water; 
traveling is out of the question ; nothing can be bought; one simply 
vegetates. " 196 The head of the Lutwaffe's Fighter Command , Adolf Galland , 
suffered a similar change in attitude. Immediately following the Hamburg 
raid , he noted that, "the Allies had proved that extermination raids of 
strategical importance on the territory of the Reich were possible .11!97 Less 
then six months later, he ordered a shift in priorities away from defending 
against the nighttime forays of the British bombers to concentrating on the 
daylight attackers. He understood that the former were more numerous, at 
least to the end of 1943, and inflicted a greater hardship on the civilian 
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population, but the American precision raids were of greater consequence to 
industry.198 
Instead of preparing civilians for a deterioration of their living standards , 
the Nazis made bold statements bragging that no bombs would ever touch 
the Reich . After the number and ferocity of attacks mounted, "Berliners, after 
being marooned for three and four hours at a time in the middle of the night 
in their drafty, damp cellars, began showing up late for work in the mornings, 
pasty-faced, and red-eyed and acting snappish and bad-tempered. " 199 
According to Richard Overy, productivity suffered greatly "as in the Ford plant 
in Cologne, in the Ruhr, where absenteeism rose to 25% of the workforce for 
the whole of 1944. Even those who turned up for work were listless and 
anxious. We did not get enough sleep and were very tense ," noted several 
survivors. 200 Just as in London, continuous air raid alarms and the stress of 
being under the threat of annihilation was most difficult for "children and frail 
old people who suffered disproportionately," recorded diarist Mathilde Wolff· 
Monckeberg. 201 
The euphoria of easy victory during the first three years of war was 
replaced by the dread of area bombing. It was the R.A.F. that shattered that 
daydream with a vengeance. 202 Life for civilians degenerated to such a low 
level that the people became interested only in survival. 203 A major cause of 
the sullen mood on the German home front was the physical damage inflicted 
upon the cities. American soldiers approaching the Reich's capital in late 
spring 1945 wrote letters home noting that it was "covered by a thick haze, 
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mostly smoke from the fires that were still smoldering. Buildings that we 
thought were undamaged were merely hollow shells and the interiors had 
been completely gutted by fire and bomb blast. Those that had not burned 
were leveled either by bomb or artillery fire ."204 Every town of any 
consequence shared the fate of Berlin. Downtown districts, "were filled with 
rubble, with the signpost that had borne their name lying overturned among 
piles of plaster. "205 
The Nazis placed a high priority during the opening stages of the struggle 
on removing the scars left by bombing. In contrast to London, where 
rebuilding was postponed until the end of the war, repair work began 
immediately after a raid. 206 Initially, restoration was relatively easy to 
accomplish due to the small size of the attacks. By December 1941 , 
eyewitnesses noted that , "owing to the speed with which the German 
authorities work to remove signs of damage, it now is extremely difficult to 
discover any traces of it in a city of Berlin 's dimensions."207 It is important 
to remember that the Blitz basically transpired over a three and one·half 
month period with raids becoming lighter and less frequent. The bombing 
campaign against Germany lasted much longer, involved a far greater 
tonnage of bombs dropped and intensified as the war progressed. Three 
and one·half years after the Allied aerial counter offensive began , there was 
not "a house still standing that did not have some type of damage either by 
fire, bomb, or shell. Life in Berlin had practically ceased to exist."208 
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Chapter Five 
THE ISSUE OF MORALE 
Both the Luftwaffe and Bomber Command had begun their campaigns of 
strategic bombing with the primary goal of breaking the morale of the civil ian 
population. It was believed that the indiscriminate destruction of urban areas 
would create such a backlash among the masses, that pressure wou ld be 
brought to bear upon political leaders to end the war. 
The morale of combat troops exposed to strategic bombing has not been 
thoroughly studied due to the infrequent occasions in which observable 
results have occurred. The heavy bombers were rarely employed in tactical 
situations but when they were, the impact was overwhelming. Ninety days 
before D·Day, Bomber Command and the Army Air Corps were ordered to 
institute an interdiction campaign against the French rail system. The 
purpose was to isolate the upcoming Normandy battlefield from any form of 
reinforcement and resupply. The bulk of the Panzer divisions in the West 
were concentrated near the Pas de Calais in anticipation of where Hitler 
believed to be the most logical landing point for the coming invasion. 
Eisenhower encouraged the ruse by establishing a mythical army, 
commanded by General Patton , directly across from the narrowest point 
between France and England. It was critical that the Panzers should not be 
allowed to move south and west to threaten the real landing sites. The heavy 
bombers were extremely effective at destroying bridges and marshalling 
yards and did in fact paralyze the French transportation system throughout 
all of northwestern France. By late May, 1944, French railway traffic had 
declined to 55% of the January figure and down to 30% by 0 -Day. 
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Destruction of the bridges over the Se ine completed the isolat ion of the 
battlefield . By July, 1944 only 10% of the rolling stock dispatched to 
Normandy successfully reached the Wehrmacht in compar ison to the quant ity 
sh ipped on ly six months earl ier .209 
An even more brutal display was code named Operation Cobra . Six weeks 
after D-Day, the Allies were struggling to breakout of the beachheads . The 
bocage countryside had impeded progress and negated the decided Allied 
advantage in mobility and numbers. German tanks were slower but much 
more heavily armed and armoured , thus perfectly suited for defense. In order 
to clear a path onto open terrain , a massive strike by strategic bombers was 
ordered. The target area was comparatively small in si ze and began 
immediately forward of the American front lines. Over one thousand , five 
hundred B-17s and B-24s pounded the German defensive positions in a raid 
lasting less then one hour. According to the German commander at the 
scene, "70% of his troops were either dead, wounded , or had a nervous 
breakdown . "210 The psychological effect was astonishing. One of the most 
experienced divisions in the Wehrmacht , the Panzer Lehr, simply melted 
away under the iron rain. American soldiers collected dazed and confused 
survivors and encountered no resistance anywhere in the target area . 
In the cities however, a defense could be erected against the bombers . 
Deep shelters protected the majority of citizens from physical harm. Flak, 
searchlights , smoke and decoy fires disrupted the aim of the bombardiers 
and fighters harassed and destroyed the attackers. Some commentators 
claimed that British morale was sustained during the Blitz even among the 
victims in Coventry. Historian Constantine FitzGibbon stated, "it became 
209 Keegan ., p. 347 . 
210 Galla nd., p. 288. 
86 
evident that none of the punishment taken had affected by one iota the 
national determination to withstand aggression. "211 Similarly in Germany, 
even after four months of major night ra ids on Berlin and the disaster in 
Hamburg, author Peter Calvocoressi bel ieved that "morale broke in neither 
city. "212 Other sources though , paint a far more ambiguous picture. 
Japanese diplomats stationed in Berlin offer a valuable insight into the 
general mood of civilians . In coded messages, they referred to "moments of 
general panic, such as after the Hamburg raid, and an increasing apathy 
among the German populace as the fortunes of war turned against Berlin ."21 3 
As early as Rudolf Hess' mysterious flight to England in May 1941, Nazi party 
officials noted, "a not insignificant decline of popular optimism."214 
But as the war dragged on , it became impossible to conceal the extent of 
the crisis . The horror stories from evacuees fleeing the bombed out cities 
spread by word of mouth. The sight of hundreds of American aircraft bold 
enough to attack in broad daylight directly contradicted the hopelessly 
optimistic broadcasts from the Propaganda Ministry. In the hardest hit cities , 
a new plague was unleashed upon the hapless survivors. Both Cologne and 
Hamburg, "faced the menace of droves of vicious rats, grown strong by 
feeding on the corpses that were left unburied within the rubble as well as the 
potatoes and other food supplies lost beneath the broken buildings."215 
Those who left sometimes returned to the site of their former home not 
out of loyalty to the Nazi Party or with a renewed sense of optimism but to 
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protect what little was left. If the only re lic of their previous life was a bomb 
crater, at least there was a place to rebuild if the war ever ended . 
One measure of the r ising despondency among the German people is a 
comparison of the birth rates for German women before and during the war. 
Unfortunately, many records were destroyed or lost during the bombing and 
subsequent land battles. Fortunately, there are several 'mood reports ' 
compiled by Party bureaucrats that did survive. For the Nazis, it was 
considered crucial for German women of childbearing age to produce as 
many offspring as possible . Continuous surveys were undertaken to judge the 
desire of fertile women to reproduce. It was discovered that as the war 
progressed , most urban females rejected the idea of bearing additional 
children . Survival for adults was difficult enough and was believed to be 
almost impossible for newborns. The degradation of basic hygiene among 
the ruins and the difficulty in procuring enough food and adequate shelter 
consumed much of the strength otherwise required to deliver and care for an 
infant. .There was also the distin<~t possibility that a child would grow up 
without a father as the list of German men killed or captured grew into the 
millions. It is not possible to accurately ascertain the drop in birth rates but 
according to extant documents the situation was serious enough to warrant 
the attention of the Nazi hierarchy. 216 
The problem with studying morale is that "it is a word without scientific 
meaning."217 Losses can be measured in men killed, wounded, or captured 
and in the number of aircraft damaged or destroyed. Determining the status 
of the morale of non·combatants is much more difficult. In an attempt to 
somehow quantify the concept, the United States government commissioned 
2 16 Ibid., p. 86. 
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postwar surveys to ascertain German wart ime morale. "I t was found that 
38% of the respondents thought the war was already lost by January 
1942. "218 By the end of 1942, opinion research showed that although most 
people still believed Germany would win the war, there was growing 
uneasiness. 219 Defeat at El Alamein in November 1942 and at Stalingrad in 
February 1943, no doubt worsened the feel ing of impending doom. An 
internal secret service report in spring 1944 noted the mood in both rural 
and urban areas as being one of, " interest only in survival. Almost no one 
believed that the bombing offensive could be stopped or that anything short 
of a miracle could save Germany."220 When asked after hostilities had 
concluded, "what was the hardest thing for civilians during the war, 91% said 
bombing. "221 
The death of 600,000 citizens, the almost total destruction of every 
major industrial city, and the millions of sons, fathers, and relatives killed in 
combat caused deep depression among many of those lucky enough to still 
be alive. Despite all the negatives, resistance from fanatical S.S. units 
continued until almost every square mile of German territory was physically 
occupied by the Allies. Winston Churchill believed that, "even if all the towns 
of Germany were rendered largely uninhabitable, it does not follow that the 
military control would be weakened or even that war industry could not be 
carried on ."222 Americans living in Germany before the declaration of war 
noted that, "Berlin contains few important military objectives and it would be 
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possible to flatten out all of them without really affect ing Germany's war 
effort. "223 
Neither the British or the Nazis specif ied exactly how to determine if 
progress was being made in breaking the fortitude of the enemy. No one 
quite knew how to express themselves ; how, for instance, to show defeatism , 
should one actually feel defeated . There is no reality mechanism , no bridge 
from fantasy to achievement. 224 British politics offered the electorate both a 
far right Fascist and far left Communist Party but both had very small 
memberships and were considered too radical for consideration by the 
mainstream. Despite the obvious pain and resultant bitterness and despair, 
"there was no one to canalize this sensation of abandonment and misery into 
the sort of mass uprisings which Hitler had hoped his bombing would 
produce ."225 There was no individual or organized group capable of offering 
a viable political alternative, and the democratic process was de facto frozen 
for the duration of the conflict. Both the United States and England decided 
to continue supporting the same leaders until victory was complete . 
It is of interest to note the apparent reversal of roles between the 
democracies and the totalitarian governments. During the war, British and 
American citizens both allowed a far greater concentration of power to the 
state than had been previously thought possible. Individual rights were 
willingly surrendered and the fate of the nation was entrusted to the military. 
Draconian measures unthinkable in peacetime were willingly accepted. The 
rationing of almost every consumer product from food to automobile tires 
was instituted. Government boards assumed control of a large percentage of 
the manufacturing base and arbitrarily decided what was to be built. The 
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draft was quickly expanded to cover a larger age group and strict censorship 
was imposed on the public, the media , and even letters sent home. These 
unimaginable intrusions were seen as a necessary accommodation to save 
Western civilization. In return, the tacit agreement was that the government 
would prosecute the war effort as expediently as possible with the highest 
regard for the lives of its servicemen. It was also understood that the true 
status of the conflict would be faithfully reported as close to real time as 
possible. The populace appreciated the need for security and certainly did 
not want to jeopardize the safety of their loved ones at the front but it was 
expected that news should be accurate and forthcoming. 
Once the democracies were finally committed, a deep reservoir of goodwill 
existed that was drawn upon to withstand the necessary sacrifices. A high 
percentage of U.S. and British draft age men volunteered to serve in the 
armed forces. Stories abound of boys too young to be inducted or those who 
failed their physical examinations pursuing surreptitious means in order to be 
accepted for duty. Civilians displayed their support and enthusiasm by 
volunteering for service organizations, cutting back dramatically on their 
lifestyles, and buying war bonds. Most adults worked extended hours and 
gave up vacations, holidays, and even weekends. There is little evidence of 
coupon ration cheating or a black market. Interviews with adults who lived 
during the war years indicate that they felt most people were willing to 
sacrifice some material comforts for the common goal of winning the war. 
In stark contrast was the conduct of the governments of the Axis powers. 
Goebbels was the most recognized propaganda minister but not the only one. 
Mussolini and the Japanese War Cabinet also twisted and omitted facts when 
they were inconsistent with the party line. Axis military triumphs were held 
225 FitzGibbon. London's Burning. p.55 . 
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up as an example of the superiority of the nation over its enemies. Defeats 
created a whole new lexicon of ambiguous terms. A retreat became a 
"strategic withdrawal " and a rout was a "bold move to a more easily 
defended position " . There are many examples in which the real situation was 
deliberately distorted or completely ignored. As allied bombers expanded the 
size and frequency of their attacks, even the most fanatical Nazi realized that 
defensive efforts were failing and therefore, damage and causalities were 
increasing. 
Japanese civilians surely must have shared the same glum feeling as they 
watched American warships, some of which had been reported on more then 
one occasion to have been sunk, bombard their homeland. Even a 
totalitarian regime depends to some degree on a measure of popular support 
if it expects its citizens to place their lives at risk . 
Unfortunately for the Germans, political options had been non·existent since 
Hitler consolidated his grip on power in 1933. The fact was that people in 
the Nazi police state were not in a position to infiL,Jence national will as much 
as in a democracy. 226 The all·consuming struggle to secure adequate food 
and warm shelter made political resistance, the last thing on the minds of 
those living under the hail of bombs. 227 
The term 'morale' is far too ambiguous and not subject to rigorous 
enough quantification to justify the expenditure of blood and treasure in 
pursuit of obliterating it. Likewise, vengeance was inadequate as a guiding 
military strategy. During the Blitz, Londoners expressed, "almost no 
bitterness or resentment towards the enemy. References to the Germans are 
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of a good-humored , joking kind. "228 In Germany, downed aviators , "were the 
objects of much curiosity" and "most men captured in these rural areas say 
they were treated with the natural kindness one finds in most country 
dwellers."229 Goering had ordered that no R.A.F. man was to be unfairly 
treated while he was in the hands of the Luftwaffe and thousands of ex-
prisoners will testify that these orders were faithfully obeyed .230 Not even 
Hitler could inspire the vast majority of Germans to seek revenge against 
those who bombed their cities into rubble. There was some abuse of Allied 
aircrews but, "these shootings were not carried out by the Luftwaffe, who 
were normally responsible for R.A.F. prisoners, but by the SS"231 
As time passed, fear gradually rose to dominate the lives of the German 
and Japanese citizenry. The word can be defined as apprehension or dread 
and is especially applicable when involving the ultimate unknown, death. 
Douhet predicted that the fear of being bombed would be so intense that 
future conflicts would be of very short duration. One way fear can be 
detected is by noting a change in behavior consistent with placing survival 
above all other needs. Humans can be both motivated into action by fear or 
forced to constrain themselves . The British tolerated the destruction of their 
great cities due to the fear of a greater evil , the invasion of their homeland. 
The Nazis displayed the same reaction declaiming that, " if Germany is 
conquered, then you will all be deported as slave labor to Siberia."232 As 
disaster threatened , Goebbels worked to inculcate the feeling that the only 
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way to avert being overrun by the enemy was to stick by Hitler.233 Not even 
the censorship of a totalitarian regime could suppress the stories and rumors 
of German atrocities toward Russian civilians and prisoners. One survivor 
summed up the feeling of many stating that as the Soviets advanced closer to 
Germany, "one thing is clear to all of us: a Russian break-through would 
mean disaster. Then there ' ll be nothing left but to take poison . "234 Certain 
death or slavery at the hands of the Communists was worse than the 
privations endured by the Germans, even the possibility of being killed by 
strategic bombing. The reaction of the majority of non -belligerents became 
demoralized but still continued on . It was more tolerable to be bombed and 
starved by the Allies then raped and shot by the Russians. As long as any 
hope remained that the Americans and British would occupy Germany, 
civilians remained wherever they felt comparatively secure and did everything 
they could to survive. When that possibility ceased to exist, a mass exodus to 
the protection of Western armies ensued. 
The undefined and undefinable idea of morale was usurped by a more 
base and far more effective motivator: fear. Over half a century after the end 
of World War II, fear is still the keystone of global military security. The 
advent of nuclear arms finally scared mankind enough to impose self-
discipline on even our darkest desires for power, chaos, and destruction. The 
knowledge that one bomb can wipe off the face of the Earth an entire city is 
indeed frightening but is exactly the reality that was , and is , required to keep 
the peace among the great powers. In two world wars separated by only 
twenty-one years, 'civilized' men inflicted an estimated 46,000,000 deaths 
233 Calvocoressi ., p. 530 . 
234 Wolff-Monckeberg ., p. 77 . 
94 
upon each other and probably wounded the same number.235 Being 
vaporized in a mushroom cloud or dying a slow death due to rad iation 
poisoning is too horrible to contemplate. It is the overrid ing sense of fea r 
that keeps the peace. 
The six years of World War II provided the opportuni ty to test the theory 
of strategic aerial warfare. The need for greater accuracy and explosive 
power was demonstrated first by the Germans and then by the Western Allies. 
Atomic weapons represented only a difference of degree not in kind . Their 
development and deployment made possib le the fulfillment of the post-World 
War I prophets; an offensive action aimed at civilian populations with the 
deliberate intent to kill non-combatants and destroy property for the purpose 
of shortening war. After an extensive period of experimentation in Europe, 
'conventional ' bombing achieved discernable results but failed to end great 
power conflicts. Nuclear warheads delivered via strategic air forces , however, 
finally proved Douhet correct. 
235 Britannica Macropaedia., pp. 1008, 1044. 
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Chapter Six 
THE ISSUE OF MORALITY 
The moral aspect of strategic bombing generates the most controversy. 
Present day authors have liberally criticized both British and American efforts 
to "wage war from 20,000 feet." Crit ics contend that randomly dumping high 
explosives, incendiaries, and atomic bombs upon civ il ians and cities was and 
is immoral. Wars are still to be fought away from the centers of civilizat ion 
and contested between groups of armed men. The destruction of German 
cities by British nighttime area bombing raids was deemed brutal and 
counterproductive. Especially barbaric and unnecessary was the attack on 
the militarily insignificant city of Dresden. A medieval jewel of architecture 
and mostly wooden buildings, Dresden experienced a firestorm almost as 
devastating as Hamburg's. The raid was conducted when the war in Europe 
was essentially over and the main railway station was crowded with refugees 
fleeing the rapidly approaching Red Army. 
Even harsher in his condemnation of the U.S. Army Air Corps is Michael 
Sherry. He believes that operations over Japan were conducted with little or 
no regard to specific military targets . Supposedly, the United States fell in 
love with the new technology of strategic air weapons and completely lost 
sight of the suffering endured by the victims. Reconnaissance photos were 
incapable of detailing the level of death and hardship being inflicted upon 
those on the ground. Out of touch with the consequences of their actions, the 
Americans continued to blast and burn the home islands without remorse, 
constraint, or a guiding strategy. 
Another of Sherry's premises is that the entire concept of strategic aerial 
bombardment was irrational. In both Europe and Japan , the original concept 
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was to deploy high altitude, four engine ai rcraft that utilized sophisticated 
aiming mechanisms to ensure precision accuracy. The higher a bomber 
could fly, the safer it would be from anti-aircraft fire and from most fighters. 
The Norden bombsight was necessary in order to concentrate ordnance 
exactly on target. Due to the failure to perform as envisioned , Sherry asserts 
that the entire effort lacked a strategic focus and was therefore an 
unreasonable course of action. B-17 and B-24 pilots and bombardiers 
dumped their payload across the German countryside and were no better 
than their area bombing British brethren . Defensive smokescreens and the 
nearly constant cloudy weather, especially in the winter, made a mockery of 
ostensibly accurate daylight attacks. 
Over Japan , the even higher ceiling B-29 was nearly useless as a weapon 
because of the newly discovered jetstream and the havoc its tornadic winds 
created. By switching to low level area bombing night attacks, the futility of 
U.S. doctrine became fully exposed. Sherry also argues that the reason 
Japan was destroyed was because Americans were racists. Joining Sherry in 
his condemnation is John Dower. Dower claims that, "the Allied struggle 
against Japan exposed the racist underpinnings of the European and 
American colonial structure. Japan did not invade independent countries but 
colonial outposts ."236 Supposedly, Americans hated the Japanese more than 
the Germans. The end result was a policy of extermination toward the former 
-a war without mercy. Dower states that the conduct of the war in the 
Pacific was somehow more brutal and vicious because the Japanese were of a 
different race. Dower bolsters his thesis by presenting a plethora of racist 
and negative documentation. Included are motion picture portrayals of 
236 John W. Dower. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. (New 
York : Pantheon Books, 1986). P. 5. 
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Ja panese as monkeys and sub-huma ns, editori al ca rtoons with buck tooth , 
eyeglass wearing short people, and media accounts of no holds barred 
combat in the South Pac ific. The crown ing piece of evidence is the fact that 
only Japan was subjected to atomic bomb attack, not Germany. 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to quantify which enemy was hated more. 
For every reference to 'Jap ' and 'yellow peril ,' there was a 'Kraut ' and 'Hun' 
threatening Europe. Approximately 120,000 Japanese-Americans were 
interred on the West Coast after Pearl Harbor but anti-German sentiment also 
was very strong. Every American of German descent could not be interred 
however, because there were too many. There are numerous first hand 
accounts of families no longer speaking German and being ridiculed even in 
Indiana . There was a great deal of anger directed towards Japan during the 
conflict since it was they, not the Germans, who attacked American soil 
without a declaration of war. No doubt that stereotypical epithets and slurs 
were aimed against the Japanese but to claim as fact that Japan was more 
hated is impossible to verify. 
There are other aspects of Dower 's argument , however, that can be 
repudiated with facts. Neither China nor Korea were Western colonies and 
yet both were victims of Japanese aggression . If Americans hated all people 
of Asian descent , then why did the U.S. help Chiang Kai -shek battle the 
Communists and Japan? The answer is that it was in the best interests of 
America to confront both communism and fascism. Filipinos and U.S. 
soldiers fought and died together to defend Bataan and Corregidor and later 
to liberate the Philippines. Certainly there must have been some degree of 
affinity fo r Asian countries in order for America to commit blood and treasure 
for the defense of China and the liberation of Burma and the Philippines . 
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Within the context of strategic bombing, the B-29 was designed to be a high 
altitude, precision bomber. It was only after almost two years in the field that 
the jetstream finally proved to be too disruptive for the new aircraft to be 
deployed in its original mode. Allied intelligence had known since at least the 
1923 Tokyo earthquake that Japanese cities were easily combustible. Still , 
the original intent was to precision bomb Japan's war machine. If the 
weather eliminated the option of precision bombing, then the choice was 
either to firebomb at low altitude or do nothing. If destroying Japanese cities 
and demonstrating the fallibility of the ruling military regime would shorten 
the war, perhaps it was not an unreasonable course of action considering the 
circumstances of the time. It would be beneficial if modern revisionists 
would offer plausible options that could have been employed during the war. 
Authors living safely in a peaceful and secure world made possible by those 
they criticize could greatly bolster their position if they would propose and 
discuss alternative solutions for World War II commanders and leaders. 
An additional fact to consider when debating the theory of race hate as the 
basis for military operations against Japan, is the distribution of leaflets over 
cities warning residents to flee before the next raid. B-29s dropped blizzards 
of Japanese language flyers notifying civilians of the targets that would soon 
be attacked and imploring them to leave.237 Similar occurrences in Europe 
have not been documented . 
It is also true that America was benevolent in victory. Instead of 
exterminating the Japanese in death camps and by starvation, food and other 
assistance was generously provided at the end of hostilities. The Emperor 
was not even deposed; only required to renounce his divinity. Regarding 
237 Ronald Schaffer. Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II . (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985) p. 141-142. 
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Dower's assertion that race hate dictated that the atom bomb was dropped 
only on Japan, reference to a time line is adequate to refute his argument. 
Germany capitulated during the first week of May, 1945. It was not until July 
16, 1945 that "the first atomic weapon had been successfully detonated at 
Alamogordo in the New Mexico desert. "238 Nuclear weapons were still being 
developed by the end of the war in Europe and therefore, could only be used 
in the Pacific . 
The most criticized figure is of course, 'Bomber' Harris. He is considered 
so overzealous in pursuit of area bombing that detractors believe him to be 
cruelly inhuman. John Keegan states that strategic bombing, "was certainly 
not fair play" and that "the British people had chosen not to acknowledge 
that they had descended to the enemy's level."239 Keegan does concede that 
the bombing campaign effectively drained two million productive workers out 
of armaments manufacturing.240 In his own defense, Harris claims that 
policy was already articulated before he was given command . The mission of 
Bomber Command was to inflict as much harm upon the Nazis as possible 
while absorbing as few losses as absolutely possible. The only way for Britain 
to strike back after the fall of France was via the air. Daylight bombing was 
far too perilous for a country of such limited financial and manpower 
resources and thus was best left to the vastly richer United States. Radar 
and other navigational aids were far too primitive in the early 1940's to offer 
accurate targeting data. Aiming at targets close to prominent geographic 
features or at the center of built-up urban centers was the best method by 
which to improve accuracy. Great Britain had no other option if it wanted to 
contribute to the effort to defeat Hitler: bomb at night using the best 
238 John Keegan ., p. 482. 
239 John Keegan ., p. 361. 
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technology available, or do nothing. Without doubt, the latter was 
unacceptable. 
Of the contemporary critics reviewed , not one has offered a practical 
solution that would have solved Great Britain's dilemma. Was Winston 
Churchill to stand by idly from September, 1940 to D·Day June 1944 while 
his country was attacked and its citizens killed in their homes? Could any 
elected official in a democratic society ignore the anguished cries of his fellow 
countrymen to do something, anything, to alleviate the suffering? It is a fact 
that Britain could not sustain the losses inherent in a campaign of more 
accurate daylight bombing. Would it have been a more moral course of 
action if Bomber Command operated during the day and therefore sustained 
higher losses of aircrews? The families of those men who survived but might 
not have if bombing was conducted without the protective cover of night, 
might disagree. Of the two million workers diverted to the anti ·aircraft 
system, how many fewer tanks and guns were built that would have been 
encountered on the battlefield? How many soldiers were saved by the 
sacrifice of the R.A.F.? What was the moral thing to do and what wasn't? It is 
far too easy to claim the high ground when someone else was forced to make 
the hardest of all decisions; who lives and who dies. 
Ronald Schaffer offers another perspective. He believes that the moral 
issue of strategic bombing extends to more than attacks on cities and 
civilians to include damage "to artifacts of civilization such as libraries, 
cathedrals, monaster.ies and famous works of art. "241 He notes that moral 
constraints among the belligerents almost invariably bowed to military 
necessity but that there was substantial dispute over what military necessity 
240 Ibid. 
241 Schaffer., Introduction, xii . 
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meant. Yes there were racist American attitudes towards both the Japanese 
and Germans. Both countries were seen as threats to civilization and their 
leaders as evil incarnate. Yet, the desire to shorten the war seemed to 
supersede personal attitudes and beliefs. Eisenhower, the Supreme Alli ed 
Commander in Europe said , " I am always prepared to take part in anything 
that gives real promise to ending the war quickly. "242 President Roosevelt 
issued letters asking for information that "would satisfy his purposes- to 
bring about surrender. "243 President Truman observed about the atomic 
bomb, "it seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be 
made the most useful."244 Even Curtis LeMay remarked in his memoirs, "that 
if a nuclear weapon shortened the war by a single week, it probably saved 
more lives than it destroyed."245 The cold and hard attitudes of the ti me 
offend the sensibilities of modern historians but contemporary authors must 
remain cognizant of the environment in which decisions were made. The 
British and American officers, political leaders and aircrews were not blood 
thirsty, immoral killers bent on destroying the world for their private gain. 
They were people living under the most extraordinary pressure imaginable 
applying all their talents in attempting to win a world war and reinstate the 
peace. 
The impact of the strategic bombing campaign has clearly been 
art iculated . The Axis powers were forced to reallocate their resources to 
defend themselves against the British and American air attacks. The 
manufacture of weaponry, its deployment, and especially the fuel to power it 
was disrupted and eventually almost entirely eliminated. By the end of the 
242 Ibid., p.84. 
243 Ibid. , p. 89. 
244 Ibid. , p. 174. 
245 Ibid., p. 152. 
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conflict in Japan, Douhet had been wholly vindicated that command of the air 
was the first and most important prerequisite for any military enterprise. 
Despite the positive accomplishments, some feel that the entire concept 
was wrong. The problem with condemning strategic air warfare as immoral 
is that value judgements are necessary. The old 'social contract ' inferred 
that killing a young, physically fit soldier in the field is acceptable but a 
civilian in his home is not. It was also agreed that the very young, elderly, 
and women are off limits to the horrors of actual combat and only purely 
military targets can be attacked. The airplane forced a change in the 
philosophy of armed conflict. Total war now extended beyond the sea and 
land battles of the past. No country, no person is safe from the reach of an 
enemy. The paradigm of combat in specific places among trained 
professionals is now obsolete. If great powers engage again in total war, 
complete annihilation of the participants becomes a distinct possibility, if not 
a certainty. Adhering to a strict code of conduct is an anachronism and the 
old moral arguments are irrelevant. 
The secret of flight and the construct ion of nuclear weapons cannot be 
unlearned or wished away. Death is the same whether by conventional 
weaponry or inflicted by an atomic bomb. What is truly upsetting is the 
removal of much of the range of human emotions from the decision to wage 
war. Morality has been supplanted by a very basic choice: pursue a great 
power war and run the very real risk of being destroyed, or find alternative 
means to resolve conflicts. Some form of moral philosophy underlies almost 
all human endeavors but within the context of military doctrine, has been 
replaced by the desire to survive. The real debate is whether to proceed 
forward or return to a pre·1945 conventional military posture. If the latter is 
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chosen, nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them will be eliminated. 
Under such a scenario, the complete spectrum of human emotions wi ll return 
to its role as arbiter for deciding which path individual nations should pursue 
in search for national security. In a perfect world , all parties would agree to 
the best path for peace and prosperity and embark un ited on the trip. 
Utopian ideals however, do not sufficiently address the base nature of man . 
Unfortunately, greed, violence, and the lust for power are also part of our 
character. It would be pure folly to remove the straight jacket that we have 
imposed upon ourselves. 
There have been wars since 1945 but not a total war among the great 
powers. The bombing and death of civilians was horrible in World War Two. 
The incineration of Dresden, Hamburg, and Tokyo was truly gruesome and 
unnatural. Fortunately, two positive benefits have arisen. The first is that the 
democracies triumphed over tyranny. The second is that total war can never 
be unleashed again . The cold horror of strategic bombing was instrumental 
in bringing both benefits to fruition. 
Obviously the death of nine million people during the First World War was 
not enough to convince our species to resort to other means in addressing 
international differences. During World War Two, could the death of one or 
two million people less have been enough to change human behavior? It is a 
moot question. What has been realized is that strategic bombing not only 
shortened the conflict by destroying military capabilities but also left a legacy 
so terrible that it cannot be allowed to be repeated. Has morality been 
served? The end justified the means. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Zeppelin and Gotha air raids on London during the course of the 
Great War, left an indelible mark on the psyche of several visionary military 
commanders. It was hoped that the next war would be of short duration as 
the mass bombing of vulnerable cities would quickly fracture the resolve of 
the opponent's home front, forcing political leaders to sue for peace. The 
Blitz was the initial large scale experiment testing whether the systematic 
and prolonged aerial bombardment of a basically undefended urban area was 
enough to decide the outcome of a great power conflict. This experiment was 
unsuccessful. The three and one·half months of the Blitz was found to be too 
short of a time span to eliminate Great Britain as a belligerent solely by a 
conventional air campaign. It was discovered that German bombers 
delivered an inadequate weight and number of bombs over too scattered a 
geographic range to cause much lasting harm. In reaction to the attacks, the 
British flocked to shelters thereby greatly reducing the actual number of 
casualties . The Blitz killed thousands and spread privation throughout 
England but the alternative of permitting the Nazis to invade their island 
home was considered worse than the suffering they endured. 
Britain, and later the United States, initiated the second phase of the 
process when they counterattacked German cities and industry. Heavier 
ordnance and larger payloads delivered more frequently and in the case of 
the Americans , far more accurately, had a greater impact. Over ten times as 
many German civilians were killed and almost every city of consequence was 
severely damaged. Despite an increase in the quantity of weapons 
manufactured by Germany, the number of ships , tanks, and planes delivered 
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to and utilized on the battlefield was dramatically lowered especially after 
night time navigational aids were perfected and long range daylight fighter 
escorts were employed . 
German non-combatants adjusted very much in the same manner as 
the British even though eventually, prolonged exposure to repeated attacks 
brought wholesale destruction to the Third Reich. The fear of being killed by 
an ideologically opposed enemy however, was greater than the discomfort of 
living under the iron rain. Even after three and one-half years of increasingly 
intense raids, German civilians did not rise in rebellion against their 
government. There is evidence that productivity suffered as the campaign 
progressed but the idea of attacking civilian morale was proven to be a dead 
end on the evolutionary path of strategic bombing. 
It can be reasonably concluded that there were some positive 
contributions to the Allied war effort as a result of strategic bombing. The 
Nazis were forced to redirect critical manpower and resources away from the 
Eastern front to protect the homeland. This movement allowed the Russians 
to more easily gain tactical air superiority over the vast battlefields in the 
east. Although armament manufacturing increased during most of the 
conflict, it became much more difficult to transport and employ weapons with 
the rail and oil processing systems substantially reduced. Three and one-half 
years of around the clock attacks gradually wore out the Luftwaffe by killing 
or grounding its best pilots. Like most previous great power wars, the 
outcome of World War II was decided at the front where young men 
endeavored to kill each other as efficiently as possible. The German war 
machine, especially the Wehrmacht, spent itself on the steppes and in the 
cities of Russia . There are a plethora of other factors and -considerations but 
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the majority of the killing occurred in the east. Strategic bombing in Europe 
assisted the Allies to victory but it was not the sole means of winning the war. 
During the initial application of Douhet 's theory, there were two 
conspicuous differences between what was postulated and what was 
observed . Douhet did not believe that defense against bomber attack would 
be possib le much less effective. Fortunately for Great Britain, Fighter 
Command was created and deployed as much for offensive operations as for 
defense. Both the RAF and Luftwaffe enjoyed considerable success in 
daylight interceptor missions. Fighters were so successful that Great Britain 
and Germany were forced to bomb at night after incurring unsupportable 
losses during the day. Even American aircraft specifically designed for the 
task of daytime missions were found incapable of adequately defending 
themselves against determined fighter attacks. The second noticeable 
discrepancy during the war years in Europe was the fact that civilian morale 
failed to disintegrate. Douhet felt that the calamity of strategic bombing 
would cause panicky non-combatants to force their political leaders to sue for 
peace. British and German civilians were killed and wounded and survivors 
were adversely affected but in a very general sense, the populace in both 
countries somehow 'muddled through.' It was the development and 
deployment of nuclear weapons that finally vindicated Douhet 's faith in the 
bomber. 
Douhet explicitly stated that a bomb needed to completely destroy an 
area within a radius of five hundred meters. No such conventional weapon 
existed during the time of World War II in Europe. It was the successful 
completion of the Manhattan Project that made possible the fruition of pre· 
war prophecies. The precise guidance and destructiveness of nuclear 
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warheads attained the level necessary to threaten the viability of our species. 
The need to survive, and the fear that we might not, was enough to finally 
convince humanity to disdain total war as an option in international relat ions. 
The first tangible proof of the fulfillment of strategic bombing's destiny was 
the end of hostilities with Japan. The invasion of Japan proper, and the 
estimated 1,000,000 American casualties, was avoided. The Japanese were 
also saved from the mass suicide that they so willingly committed in every 
other battle in the Pacific theater. The second benefit was the halt of Russian 
expansion at the agreed upon borders in Western Europe. With U.S. soldiers 
clamoring to go home after V·E Day, a power vacuum existed . The British , 
French, and Germans were all too weak to impede the surge of the powerful 
and victorious Red Army. Only American possession of the bomb, and the Air 
Force to deliver it , restrained Stalin and permitted the West time to rebuild 
the shattered continent. It was no secret that Stalin was already very 
impressed by the Anglo·American bombing campaign against Germany. 
Churchill had sent a large number of photographic slides detailing the 
damage caused to German targets . During the Tehran Conference at the end 
of 1943, Stalin asked "innumerable and very intelligent questions about 
American long·range bombers. "246 He had made several formal requests for 
British and American four·engine heavy bombers but was refused . 
The atomic bomb was the final portion of the equation needed to validate 
Douhet's theory. The European strategic bombing campaign was not by itself 
capable of achieving the full potential envisioned by airpower advocates. The 
efforts and sacrifice of the people involved however laid the groundwork for a 
new realization in military and security considerations . Perhaps the best 
246 David Holloway. Stalin and the Bomb. (London , England: Yale University Press, 
1994). P. 234. 
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summation comes from Martin Middlebrook. Commenting on the costly 
R.A. F. night raid on Nuremberg he stated, "maybe the memory of Coventry, 
Dresden and Hiroshima lives on. Harris and the Lancaster and the Hal ifax 
crews who flew to Nuremberg helped develop the attitude that mankind can 
no longer afford all·out world wars . History may one day conclude that this 
was their greatest achievement. "247 
247 Middlebrook., p. 312. 
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